










It	 would	 be	 the	 height	 of	 hubris	 for	 a	 judge	 to,	 at	 the	 behest	 of	 a	
shareholder,	 second-guess	 the	wisdom	of	 a	 board	 of	 directors’	 decision	
(this	 is	 especially	 true	 when	 one	 considers	 that	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	
judges	do	not	have	expertise	in	business).			
The	two	primary	rationales	 for	 the	business	 judgment	rule	are	(1)	
that	 directors	 are	 business	 experts	 (and	 judges	 are	 not),	 and	 (2)	 that	
application	of	the	business	judgment	rule	encourages	optimal	risk	taking	
by	directors.			
This	 Article	 will	 demonstrate	 that	 those	 rationales	 may	 justify	
deference	 to	 directors	 when	 they	 make	 ordinary	 business	 decisions;	
however,	 those	rationales	apply	with	significantly	 less	 force,	 if	at	all,	 to	
decisions	that	implicate	a	significant	social	policy	issue,	such	as	climate	
change,	or	human	rights,	among	others.			
Rather	 than	 deference	 to	 directors,	 these	 are	 decisions	 where	 the	
arguments	 in	 favor	 of	 shareholder	 input	 are	 stronger.	 	 After	 all,	 as	
Professor	Bayne	wrote	in	1957,	later	quoted	by	the	D.C.	Circuit	in	Medical	




Accordingly,	 this	Article	argues	 that	 there	 should	be	a	 “significant	










shareholder	 challenges	a	business	decision	 that	 implicates	a	 significant	
social	policy	issue,	rather	than	applying	the	business	judgment	rule	and	
showing	 deference	 to	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors,	 the	 court	
should	 apply	 the	 intermediate	 level	 of	 enhanced	 scrutiny.	 	 The	 board	
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The	 business	 judgment	 rule	 bars	 judicial	 review	 of	 a	 business	
decision	 made	 by	 a	 corporation’s	 board	 of	 directors.1	 	 The	 classic	
example:	in	1916	the	Dodge	brothers	filed	a	lawsuit	seeking	to	enjoin	
Ford	 Motor	 Company	 from	 using	 a	 large	 multi-year	 surplus	 ($111.9	
million)	to	expand	its	manufacturing	plant	(despite	the	fact	that	Ford’s	
board	 of	 directors	 already	 voted	 for	 it).2	 	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 of	
Michigan	 refused	 to	 enjoin	 expansion	 of	 the	 plant	 (and	 in	 doing	 so	





and	 in	 the	 honest	 belief	 that	 the	 action	 taken	 was	 in	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 the	
corporation.”);	 Brehm	 v.	 Eisner,	 746	 A.2d	 244,	 264	 n.66	 (Del.	 2000)	 (“[D]irectors’	
decisions	 will	 be	 respected	 by	 courts	 unless	 the	 directors	 are	 interested	 or	 lack	
independence	 relative	 to	 the	decision,	 do	not	 act	 in	 good	 faith,	 act	 in	 a	manner	 that	
cannot	be	attributed	to	a	rational	business	purpose	or	reach	their	decision	by	a	grossly	








Ford	 to	 pay	 dividends,	 it	 reversed	 the	 trial	 court’s	 injunction	 of	 the	 new	 factory	
construction.”).	 	For	another	classic	example	of	application	of	 the	business	 judgment	
rule,	 see	 Shlensky	 v.	 Wrigley,	 237	 N.E.2d	 776,	 781	 (Ill.	 App.	 Ct.	 1968)	 (dismissing	




Where	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 is	 making	 an	 ordinary	 business	
decision,	 such	 as	 the	 decision	 to	 expand	 the	 manufacturing	 plant	 in	
Dodge	v.	Ford,	application	of	the	business	judgment	rule	is	appropriate	
(because	 directors	 have	 superior	 expertise,	 and	 the	 court	 does	 not	
want	 to	 stifle	 risk-taking);4	 however,	 where	 a	 board	 of	 directors	 is	
making	a	decision	that	implicates	a	significant	social	policy	issue	(such	
as	 climate	 change	 or	 human	 rights),	 the	 opposite	 is	 true	 for	 two	
interrelated	reasons:	
• The	 expertise	 rationale	 for	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	
applies	 with	 significantly	 less	 force,	 if	 at	 all,	 to	 decisions	
that	 implicate	 a	 significant	 social	 policy	 issue.	 	 When	 a	
decision	 implicates	 a	 significant	 social	 policy	 issue,	 the	
decision-making	 process	 necessarily	 moves	 beyond	
quantitative	 methods	 of	 analysis	 with	 which	 most	
directors	 are	 familiar	 (such	 as	 finance),	 to	 include	
qualitative	 methods	 of	 analysis	 (such	 as	 directors	
listening	 to	 impacted	 parties	 and	 incorporating	 what	
they	 hear	 into	 the	 decision-making	 process).5	 	 I	 am	not	
saying	 that	 directors	 are	 incapable	 of	 listening	 to	
impacted	parties,	or	incapable	of	incorporating	what	they	





2000	 WIS.	 L.	 REV.	 573,	 587–89	 (2000).	 	 Professor	 Davis	 traces	 the	 “sovereignty”	
rationale	 for	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 to	 section	 141	 of	 the	 General	 Corporation	
Law,	that	states,	“[t]he	business	and	affairs	of	a	corporation	.	.	.	shall	be	managed	by	.	.	.	
a	 board	 of	 directors.”	 	 Id.	 at	 587	 n.34	 (quoting	 DEL.	CODE	ANN.	 tit.	 8,	 §	 141	 (2020)).		
Further,	 Professor	 Stephen	 M.	 Bainbridge	 points	 out	 that	 treating	 the	 board	 of	
directors	 like	 a	 sovereign	 is	 desirable	 because	 there	 must	 be	 an	 ultimate	 decision-
maker	 to	 resolve	 conflicts	 between	 the	 various	 constituents	 of	 the	 corporation	
(“employees,	creditors,	equity	 investors,	and	other	necessary	 factors	of	production”),	
and	the	board	of	directors	is	best	positioned	to	efficiently	do	so	(consistent	with	legal	




	 5	 Qualitative	 data	 collection	 tools	 explore	 impacts	 that	 are	 non-quantifiable,	 or	
difficult	 to	quantify.	 	Such	tools	may	 include	 interviews,	 focus	groups,	and	document	
review.	 	 See	 generally	 FELICE	 D.	 BILLUPS,	 QUALITATIVE	 DATA	 COLLECTION	 TOOLS:	 DESIGN,	
DEVELOPMENT,	 AND	 APPLICATIONS	 (2020).	 	 While	 qualitative	 assessment	 may	 involve	
looking	 at	 impacts	 on	 health	 and	 the	 environment,	 it	must	 be	 remembered	 that	 the	
board	must	 do	 so	 to	meet	 its	 fiduciary	 duty	 to	 shareholders.	 	 See	 infra	 Section	 IV.B.		
That	is	to	say,	while	stakeholders	benefit	from	such	an	understanding	of	the	director’s	




that	 directors	do	 not	 have	 any	 superior	 expertise	 in	 this	
area	that	would	justify	deferring	to	their	judgment.6		
• The	optimal	risk-taking	rationale	 for	 the	business	 judgment	
rule	 applies	 with	 significantly	 less	 force,	 if	 at	 all,	 to	
decisions	 that	 implicate	 a	 significant	 social	 policy	 issue.		
When	 a	 decision	 implicates	 a	 significant	 social	 policy	
issue,	 the	 risk	 moves	 beyond	 what	 can	 be	 diversified	
away	 (such	 as	 a	 financial	 loss),	 to	 risks	 that	 cannot	 be	
diversified	 away	 (such	 as	 climate	 risk,	 or	 human	 rights	
risk).7	
Given	the	foregoing,	I	propose	that	when	a	shareholder	challenges	
a	 decision	 that	 implicates	 a	 significant	 social	 policy	 issue,	 the	 court	
should	 apply	 the	 intermediate	 standard	 of	 enhanced	 scrutiny.8	 	 To	
meet	 the	 standard,	 the	 board	 of	 directors	must	 demonstrate	 (1)	 the	
reasonableness	 of	 “the	 decisionmaking	 process	 employed[,]	 .	.	.	
including	the	information	on	which	the	directors	based	their	decision;”	
and	 (2)	 “the	 reasonableness	 of	 the	 directors’	 action	 in	 light	 of	 the	
circumstances	then	existing.”9		Note	that	the	burden	of	proof	rests	first	




Application	of	 the	 intermediate	standard	of	enhanced	scrutiny	 is	
appropriate	 because	 it	 still	 affords	 some	 respect	 to	 the	 board	 of	
directors’	 decision	 (as	 long	 as	 the	 board	 chose	 “one	 of	 several	
reasonable	 alternatives,”	 the	 court	 should	 not	 second-guess	 the	
decision);12	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 requires	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 to	
explain	 the	 reasoning	 for	 their	 decision,	 preventing	 the	 board	 of	
directors	from	hiding	behind	the	business	judgment	rule	when	making	










	 13	 See	 John	 H.	 Matheson	 &	 Brent	 A.	 Olson,	 Shareholder	 Rights	 and	 Legislative	
Wrongs:	Toward	Balanced	Takeover	Legislation,	 59	GEO.	WASH.	L.	REV.	 1425,	1458–59	




This	 proposal	 empowers	 shareholders	 to	 force	 their	 way	 back	
into	 the	 decision-making	 process,	 albeit	 through	 litigation.14	 	 This	
power	 is	 especially	 important	 when	 we	 consider	 that	 shareholders	
have	 been	 locked	 out	 of	 less	 “confrontational”	 means	 of	 influencing	
corporate	behavior,	such	as	the	process	for	nominating	directors.		(Yes,	
it	is	true	that	shareholders	can	vote	for	directors,	but	the	vote	is	for	a	
preordained	 slate	 of	 directors.15	 	 Further,	 greater	 shareholder	
influence	through	use	of	the	proxy	access	rules	has	been,	at	best,	met	
with	mixed	success.16)	
Finally,	 and	 importantly,	 these	 are	 decisions	 (i.e.,	 decisions	 that	
implicate	 climate	 change	 or	 human	 rights)	 where	 the	 arguments	 in	
favor	 of	 shareholder	 participation	 are	 stronger,	 and	 thus	 eclipse	 the	
situationally	undermined	arguments	in	favor	of	deference	to	directors.		
Where	a	significant	social	policy	issue	is	implicated,	shareholders	have	
a	 right—indeed	 a	 duty—to	 participate	 in	 the	 decision-making	
process.17	 	As	Professor	David	Bayne	wrote	 in	1957,	 and	 it	 still	 rings	
true	today,	“[a]s	much	as	one	may	surrender	the	immediate	disposition	
of	 [his	 money	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 investment],	 he	 can	 never	 shirk	 a	







The	 historical	 practice	 in	 the	 United	 States	 has	 been	 for	 a	 public	
corporation’s	 board	 of	 directors	 (directly	 or	 through	 a	 nominating	
committee)	 to	nominate	candidates	 for	election	at	an	upcoming	annual	
meeting	 of	 shareholders.	 	 This	 exercise	 rarely	 augurs	 change	 in	 the	
corporation’s	 business	 strategies	 or	 operations	 because	 the	 nominees	
are	 usually	 incumbent	 directors	 standing	 for	 re-election.	.	.	.	 	 A	 mix	 of	




nominate	 candidates	 exceeding	 the	 number	 of	 open	 seats,	 but	 the	
practice	has	been	to	nominate	only	the	bare	minimum,	akin	to	a	political	
election	where	only	one	party	nominates	candidates.	
Eric	 D.	 Roiter,	Disentangling	Mutual	 Fund	 Governance	 from	 Corporate	 Governance,	 6	
HARV.	BUS.	L.	REV.	1,	52–53	(2016).	
	 16	 See	 infra	 Part	 III;	 see	 also	 John	 H.	 Matheson	 &	 Vilena	 Nicolet,	 Shareholder	
Democracy	 and	 Special	 Interest	 Governance,	 103	 MINN.	 L.	 REV.	 1649,	 1668–71	
(discussing	greater	shareholder	influence	via	the	proxy	access	rule).	






policy	 rationales	 the	 courts	 consider,	 such	 as	 deference	 to	 board	 of	
directors’	 expertise,	 and	 encouraging	 optimal	 risk-taking.19	 	 Part	 III	
lists	 several	 types	 of	 decisions	 that	 implicate	 significant	 social	 policy	
issues	 (these	 include,	 but	 are	 not	 limited	 to,	 decisions	 that	 implicate	
climate	change	and	human	rights).		Part	IV	explains	why	the	traditional	
policy	 rationales	 in	 favor	 of	 business	 judgment	 deference	 apply	with	
significantly	 less	 force,	 if	 at	 all,	 to	 a	 board	 decision	 that	 implicates	 a	
significant	 social	 policy	 issue.	 	 To	 illustrate	 this	 point,	 I	 use	 a	
hypothetical	decision.	 	 It	 is	 a	decision	 that,	 on	 its	 face,	 implicates	 the	
significant	 social	 policy	 issue	 of	 climate	 change:	 a	 utility	 company	 is	
facing	 increased	 demand	 for	 electricity;	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 must	
choose	between	a	new	power	generation	plant	that	will	contribute	to	
climate	 change	 (coal-fired	 or	 gas-fired)	 or	 one	 that	 will	 not	 (solar,	
wind,	or	hydroelectric).			
Part	 V	 sets	 out	my	 proposal	 for	 a	 significant	 social	 policy	 issue	
exception	 to	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule:	 where	 a	 board	 decision	




There	are	many	different	 formulations	of	 the	business	 judgment	
rule	 (and	 the	 sections	 that	 follow	 will	 discuss	 some	 of	 those	
variations).20	 	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 section,	 however,	 is	 to	 give	 the	
reader	 a	 general	 understanding	 of	 the	 mechanics	 of	 the	 business	
judgment	rule	and	the	most	salient	policy	rationales	behind	it.	
 
	 19	 I	 chose	 Delaware	 because	 “[t]he	 Delaware	 Court	 of	 Chancery	 is	 a	 specialized	
court	 of	 equity	 with	 specific	 jurisdiction	 over	 corporate	 disputes”	 and	 is	 “known	
worldwide	for	its	.	.	.	expert	and	impartial	judges	that	decide	its	corporate	cases.”		Why	
Businesses	 Choose	 Delaware,	 DELAWARE.GOV,	 https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-
businesses-choose-delaware/	 (last	 visited	 Oct.	 5,	 2021);	 see	 Robert	 B.	 Thompson	 &	
Randall	S.	Thomas,	The	New	Look	of	Shareholder	Litigation:	Acquisition-Oriented	Class	
Actions,	 57	 VAND.	 L.	REV.	 133,	 165	 (2004)	 (“[Delaware]	 is	 the	 center	 of	 shareholder	
litigation	in	this	country.”).	
	 20	 See	Julian	Velasco,	A	Defense	of	the	Corporate	Law	Duty	of	Care,	40	J.	CORP.	L.	647,	
653	 (2015)	 (“[T]he	 business	 judgment	 rule	 can	 be	 understood	 alternatively	 as	 a	
presumption,	as	a	differential	standard	of	review,	or	as	a	policy	of	non-review.”);	see	
also	E.	 Norman	 Veasey	&	 Julie	M.S.	 Seitz,	The	 Business	 Judgment	 Rule	 in	 the	 Revised	
Model	Act,	 the	Trans	Union	 Case,	 and	 the	ALI	 Project—A	Strange	Porridge,	 63	TEX.	L.	
REV.	 1483,	 1484–87	 (1985)	 (discussing	 different	 formulations	 of	 the	 business	
judgment	rule);	S.	Samuel	Arsht,	The	Business	Judgment	Rule	Revisited,	8	HOFSTRA	L.	REV.	






that	 a	board	of	directors’	decision	violates	 the	 fiduciary	duty	of	 care,	
the	 court	 will	 presume	 that	 the	 board’s	 decision	 was	 proper	 and	
dismiss	 the	 action,	 unless	 the	 shareholder	 overcomes	 the	
presumption.22	 	 The	 shareholder	 can	 overcome	 the	 presumption	 by	
showing	 one	 of	 the	 following:	 (1)	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 acted	
fraudulently;23	 (2)	 the	board	of	directors	was	grossly	negligent	 in	 the	
process	it	followed	to	reach	the	decision,	including	rushing	to	reach	a	
decision,24	or	failing	to	inform	itself25	(which	is	not	the	same	as	arguing	












duty	 to	 inform	 themselves,	 prior	 to	 making	 a	 business	 decision,	 of	 all	 material	
information	 reasonably	 available	 to	 them.”);	 see	 also	 Hanson	 Trust	 PLC	 v.	 ML	 SCM	
Acquisition,	Inc.,	781	F.2d	264,	274–75	(2d	Cir.	1986)	(holding	that,	 for	protection	of	
business	 judgment	 rule	 to	 apply,	 board	 must	 gather	 and	 review	 all	 relevant	
information).	
	 26	 The	business	 judgment	rule	never	applies	when	the	fiduciary	duty	of	 loyalty	 is	
implicated:	 self-dealing	 is	 a	 clear	 example.	 	See	 Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	The	Business	
Judgment	Rule	as	Abstention	Doctrine,	57	VAND.	L.	REV.	83,	90	(2004)	(“[T]he	business	
judgment	 rule	 has	 never	 protected	 directors	 who	 commit	 fraud	 or	 self-dealing.”).		
There	are	decisions,	however,	 that	do	not	 rise	 to	 the	 level	of	 self-dealing,	but	where	
business	 judgment	deference	 is	also	not	appropriate.	 	The	court	stated	 in	 In	re	Rural	
Metro	Corp.	Stockholders	Litig.:	
Delaware	 has	 three	 tiers	 of	 review	 for	 evaluating	 director	 decision-
making:	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule,	 enhanced	 scrutiny,	 and	 entire	
fairness.			Enhanced	 scrutiny	 is	 Delaware’s	 intermediate	 standard	 of	
review.			It	 applies	 to	 specific,	 recurring,	 and	 readily	 identifiable	
situations	 involving	potential	conflicts	of	 interest	where	the	realities	of	
the	decision-making	context	can	subtly	undermine	the	decisions	of	even	
independent	 and	 disinterested	 directors.	 	 Inherent	 in	 these	 situations	
are	subtle	structural	and	situational	conflicts	 that	do	not	rise	 to	a	 level	









Like	 many	 legal	 concepts,	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 is	 best	
understood	by	reviewing	examples	of	its	application.		Reviewing	those	
examples	 has	 the	 added	 benefit	 of	 illuminating	 the	 various	 policy	
rationales	 for	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule.	 	 We	 will	 focus	 on	 the	





explain	 the	business	 judgment	 rule.32	 	That	 is	because	Van	Gorkom	 is	
the	 rare	 case	where	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 failed	 to	 protect	 the	
board	 of	 directors.33	 	 But	 what	 makes	 this	 case	 significant	 for	 our	
purposes	is	the	stinging	dissent,	written	by	Justice	McNeilly,	where	he	
calls	 the	majority	 to	 task	 for	 failing	 to	defer	 to	 the	expertise	of	Trans	
Union’s	Directors.34			
The	 facts	of	Smith	 v.	Van	Gorkom	 are	well-known.	 	Van	Gorkom,	
late	 in	 his	 tenure	 as	 Trans	 Union’s	 Chairman	 and	 Chief	 Executive	
Officer,	undertook	to	sell	the	company.35	 	The	reason	for	the	sale	was	
ostensibly36	 to	 solve	 what	 Van	 Gorkom	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 “nagging	
 
 27 See	Weinberger	v.	UOP,	Inc.,	457	A.2d	701,	711	(Del.	1983). 
 28 See	Unocal	Corp.	v.	Mesa	Petroleum	Co.,	493	A.2d	946,	954–55	(Del.	1985). 
 29 See	 Smith	 v.	 Van	 Gorkom,	 488	 A.2d	 858,	 894–95	 (Del.	 1985)	 (McNeilly,	 J.,	
dissenting),	overruled	by	Gantler	v.	Stephens,	965	A.2d	695	(Del.	2009). 
 30 See	Brehm,	746	A.2d	at	263. 
 31 See	Gagliardi	v.	TriFoods	Int’l,	Inc.,	683	A.2d	1049,	1052–53	(Del.	Ch.	1996). 
 32 See	Van	Gorkom,	488	A.2d	at	858. 
 33 See	id.	at	881. 
 34 See	 id.	 at	 893–94	 (McNeilly,	 J.,	 dissenting).	 	 Justice	Christie	 also	dissented,	 but	
explained	his	dissent	in	only	one	paragraph,	boiling	down	to	his	belief	that	the	board’s	
action	 was	 protected	 by	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule.	 	 See	 id.	 at	 898	 (Christie,	 J.,	
dissenting). 
 35 Id.	at	866. 
 36 I	use	the	term	“ostensibly”	because	it	is	also	possible	that	Van	Gorkom,	who	was	
close	to	retirement,	was	motivated	by	a	desire	to	cash	out	his	shares	at	a	price	higher	
than	 the	 publicly	 traded	 price.	 	 See	 id.	 at	 865–66.	 	 Of	 course,	 that	 would	 raise	 the	
possibility	that	the	court	was	actually	treating	this	as	a	duty	of	loyalty	case	(as	opposed	
to	 a	 duty	 of	 care	 case),	 despite	 the	 statement	 in	 the	 decision	 that	 “there	 were	 no	
allegations	 of	 .	.	.	 self-dealing,	 or	 proof	 thereof.”	 	 Van	 Gorkom,	 488	 A.2d.	 at	 873;	
Jonathan	R.	Macey,	Smith	v.	Van	Gorkom:	 Insights	About	C.E.O.s,	Corporate	Law	Rules,	
and	 the	 Jurisdictional	 Competition	 for	Corporate	Charters,	 96	Nw.	U.	 L.	Rev.	 607,	 608	
(“The	 board’s	 decision	 was	 not	 tainted	 by	 even	 a	 hint	 of	 self-dealing	 or	 conflict	 of	




to	 fully	 take	 advantage	 of	 investment	 tax	 credits	 to	 which	 it	 was	
entitled.38		
Van	 Gorkom,	 without	 discussing	 the	 matter	 with	 the	 board	 of	
directors,	 approached	 corporate	 takeover	 specialist,	 Jay	 A.	 Pritzker,	
and	proposed	that	one	of	Pritzker’s	companies	acquire	Trans	Union.39		
He	 prepared	 a	 presentation,	 explaining	 how	Pritzker	 could	 pay	 fifty-
five	 dollars	 per	 share	 and	 pay	 off	 the	 associated	 debt	 within	 five	
years.40	 	 How	 Van	 Gorkom	 arrived	 at	 the	 fifty-five	 dollars	 figure	 is	
unclear;	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Delaware	 stated,	 “[a]part	 from	 the	
Company’s	 historic	 stock	 market	 price,	 and	 Van	 Gorkom’s	 long	
association	with	Trans	Union,	 the	 record	 is	 devoid	 of	 any	 competent	
evidence	 that	 $55	 represented	 the	 per	 share	 intrinsic	 value	 of	 the	
Company.”41	
Thereafter,	 things	 moved	 very	 quickly.42	 	 The	 initial	 meeting	
between	 Van	 Gorkom	 and	 Pritzker	 took	 place	 on	 September	 13,	
1980.43	 	Over	 the	next	 seven	days,	Van	Gorkom	and	Pritzker	worked	
out	 the	 details,	 but	 there	was	 no	 further	 negotiation	 of	 the	 fifty-five	
dollars	price.44	
Van	Gorkom	called	a	special	meeting	of	the	Trans	Union	board	of	
directors	 for	 September	 20.45	 	 Copies	 of	 the	 proposed	 merger	
agreement	were	not	available	for	the	board	to	review,	and	instead,	Van	
Gorkom	gave	a	twenty-minute	oral	presentation.46		The	entire	meeting	
lasted	 a	 mere	 two	 hours.47	 	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 meeting,	 the	 board	
approved	the	proposed	merger	agreement	sight-unseen.48	
 








 39 Id.	at	866. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See	id.	at	866–67. 
 43 Van	Gorkom,	488	A.2d	at	866. 
 44 See	id.	at	866–67. 
 45 Id.	at	867. 
 46 Id.	at	868. 
 47 Id.	at	869. 





to	 the	merger	and	undertaking	 to	consummate	 it.50	 	 Specifically,	 they	
alleged	 that	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 failed	 to	 “obtain	 the	 requisite	
information	pertinent	to	the	proposed	transaction	and	failed	to	weigh	
and	consider	carefully	the	proposed	transaction	.	.	.	.”51	
The	 majority	 agreed.52	 	 While	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 is	 a	
formidable	defense	to	a	fiduciary	duty	of	care	claim,	it	will	not	protect	
a	 decision	 that	 is	 uninformed	 or	 that	 was	 reached	 using	 a	 grossly	
negligent	 process.53	 	 The	 court	 then	 found	 that	 the	 board	 “did	 not	
adequately	 inform	 themselves	 .	.	.	 as	 to	 the	 intrinsic	 value	 of	 the	
Company”	 and	were	 “grossly	 negligent	 in	 approving	 the	 ‘sale’	 of	 the	
Company	 upon	 two	 hours’	 consideration,	 without	 prior	 notice,	 and	
without	the	exigency	of	a	crisis	or	emergency.”54			
The	Supreme	Court	of	Delaware	remanded	the	case	to	the	Court	of	
Chancery	 to	award	damages	 in	 the	amount	 that	 the	 intrinsic	value	of	
Trans	Union	exceeded	fifty-five	dollars	per	share.55		That	amounted	to	
$1.87	per	share.56		The	result	was	significant	monetary	liability	for	the	
individual	 directors	 ($23.5	 million).57	 	 At	 the	 time,	 commentators	
found	 Smith	 v.	 Van	 Gorkom’s	 imposition	 of	monetary	 liability	 on	 the	
directors	 for	 violating	 their	 fiduciary	 duty	 of	 care	 “shocking.”58	 	 The	
Delaware	 legislature	 too	was	 shocked	 and	 effectively	 overturned	 the	
case	 with	 Section	 102(b)(7),	 which	 provides	 that,	 going	 forward,	 a	
 
 49 See	generally	Amended	Verified	Complaint,	Smith	v.	Pritzker,	488	A.2d	858	(Del.	
1985)	 (No.	 6342),	 https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6509-a	 [hereinafter	 Van	
Gorkom	Complaint]. 
 50 Id.	at	10. 
 51 Id.	at	10–11. 
 52 Van	Gorkom,	488	A.2d	at	881. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id.	at	874. 
 55 Id.	at	893. 
 56 Stephen	 A.	 Radin,	 The	 Director’s	 Duty	 of	 Care	 Three	 Years	 After	 Smith	 v.	 Van	
Gorkom.,	39	HASTINGS	L.J.	707,	719	(1988). 





directors	had	been	grossly	negligent	 in	approving	a	 cash-out	merger	proposal	 .	.	.	.”);	
Edward	Rock	&	Michael	Wachter,	Dangerous	Liaisons:	Corporate	Law,	Trust	Law,	and	
Interdoctrinal	 Legal	 Transplants,	 96	 NW.	 U.	 L.	 REV.	 651,	 651	 (2002)	 (“People	 were	
shocked	 by	 Smith	 v.	Van	 Gorkom.”);	 Jonathan	 Macey,	 Smith	 v.	 Van	 Gorkom:	 Insights	





certificate	 of	 incorporation	 may	 contain	 a	 provision	 eliminating	 the	
personal	liability	of	a	director	for	breach	of	the	fiduciary	duty	of	care.59	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 Justice	 McNeilly	 wrote	 a	 stinging	 dissent	
describing	 the	majority’s	opinion	as	a	 “comedy	of	errors.”60	 	 It	 is	 that	
dissent	I	would	like	to	focus	on	now.		Justice	McNeilly	began	his	dissent	
by	 surgically	 dismantling	 the	 majority’s	 proffered	 reason	 for	 not	
deferring	 to	 the	 Trans	 Union	 board’s	 expertise,	 i.e.,	 that	 the	 Trans	
Union	board	failed	to	inform	itself	prior	to	making	the	decision.61		This,	
he	explained,	was	not	the	case.62	
But	more	 importantly,	 Justice	McNeilly’s	 dissent	 acutely	 focuses	
on	 the	 business	 expertise	 rationale	 for	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule.63		
He	 recognizes	 two	 sources	 of	 expertise:	 expertise	 gained	 through	
education	and	expertise	gained	through	experience.64	 	As	to	the	Trans	
Union	 directors’	 education,	 he	 points	 out	 that	 it	 is	 unimpeachable.65		
They	 were	 graduates	 (or	 in	 some	 cases,	 professors	 and	 deans)	 at	
prestigious	 business	 schools,	 including	 the	 College	 of	 Commerce	 and	
Business	 Administration	 of	 the	 University	 of	 Illinois	 Urbana-
Champaign	 (now	 Gies),	 the	 Business	 School	 of	 the	 University	 of	




 60 Van	Gorkom,	488	A.2d	at	894	(McNeilly,	J.,	dissenting). 
 61 Id.	at	895. 
 62 Id.		Justice	McNeilly	further	stated,	as	to	the	Trans	Union	board	being	informed,	
by	 virtue	 of	 their	 position	on	 the	board,	 they	 already	knew	most	 of	 the	 information	
they	needed	to	judge	the	proposal: 
At	 the	 time	of	 the	 September	20,	 1980	meeting	 the	Board	was	 acutely	
aware	 of	 Trans	 Union	 and	 its	 prospects.	 	 The	 problems	 created	 by	
accumulated	 investment	 tax	 credits	 and	 accelerated	depreciation	were	
discussed	 repeatedly	 at	 Board	 meetings,	 and	 all	 of	 the	 directors	
understood	the	problem	thoroughly.		Moreover,	at	the	July,	1980	Board	
meeting	the	directors	had	reviewed	Trans	Union’s	newly	prepared	five-
year	 forecast,	 and	at	 the	August,	 1980	meeting	Van	Gorkom	presented	
the	 results	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 study	 of	 Trans	 Union	 made	 by	 The	
Boston	Consulting	Group.	 	 This	 study	was	prepared	over	 an	18	month	
period	 and	 consisted	 of	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 all	 Trans	 Union	
subsidiaries,	 including	 competitiveness,	 profitability,	 cash	 throw-off,	
cash	 consumption,	 technical	 competence	 and	 future	 prospects	 for	
contribution	to	Trans	Union’s	combined	net	income.	
Id.	
 63 See	id. 
 64 See	id.	at	893–95. 
 65 See	Van	Gorkom,	488	A.2d	at	894	(McNeilly,	J.,	dissenting). 






professors,	 and	 deans	 at	 top-tier	 business	 schools,	 they	 would	 have	

























As	to	the	directors’	experience,	 it	 too	was	 impressive.68	 	The	five	
“inside”	 directors	 had	 a	 collective	 sixty-eight	 years	 of	 experience	 as	
directors	 of	 Trans	 Union.69	 	 Van	 Gorkom	 is	 representative.	 	 He	 was	




2011)	 (“Mr.	 Chelberg	 earned	 a	 Bachelor	 of	 Science	 degree	 in	 commerce	 from	 the	
University	of	Illinois	at	Urbana-Champaign.”). 
 67 ASS’N	 TO	ADVANCE	COLLEGIATE	SCHS.	 OF	BUS.	 (AACSB)	 INT’L,	2020	GUIDING	PRINCIPLES	
AND	STANDARDS	FOR	BUS.	ACCREDITATION	38	[hereinafter	GUIDING	PRINCIPLES]. 
 68 See	Van	Gorkom,	488	A.2d	at	894	(McNeilly,	J.,	dissenting). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Terry	Wilson,	 Jerome	W.	Van	Gorkom;	Revived	Schools’	Finances,	CHI.	TRIB.,	Mar.	
19,	1998,	at	12. 













The	 five	 “outside”	 directors	 had	 a	 collective	 fifty-three	 years	 of	
experience	 as	 directors	 of	 Trans	 Union.73	 	 Here,	 Graham	 Morgan	 is	
representative.		He	was	Chairman	and	CEO	of	U.S.	Gypsum	and	helped	
shepherd	over	thirty	corporate	takeovers	 in	the	two	decades	prior	to	
the	 Trans	 Union	 transaction.74	 	 Certainly,	 he	 had	 the	 experience	
necessary	 to	 evaluate	 the	 merger.	 	 The	 other	 outside	 directors	 had	
similar	experience,	as	CEOs	of	I.C.	Industries,	American	Steel,	and	Swift	
and	Company.75		
Of	 course,	 the	depth	of	 their	 experience	would	not	be	 limited	 to	
corporate	takeovers	(which	is	generally	considered	part	of	the	broader	
category	 of	 strategic	 direction).	 	 A	 panoramic	 view	 of	 areas	 where	

















 72 Id. 
 73 See	Van	Gorkom,	488	A.2d	at	894	(McNeilly,	J.,	dissenting). 
	 74	 Id.	




to	engage	 in	ongoing	day-to-day	monitoring.	 	See	 In	re	Caremark	 Int’l	 Inc.	Derivative	
Lit.,	 698	A.2d	959	 (Del.	 Ch.	1996)	 (discussing	directors’	 duty	 to	 actively	monitor).	 	 I	
also	 do	 not	 include	 “softer”	 duties,	 such	 as	 setting	 the	 tone	 at	 the	 top.	 	 See	Mary	 Jo	
White,	 Chair,	 Sec.	&	 Exch.	 Comm’n,	 A	 Few	Things	Directors	 Should	Know	About	 the	
SEC,	Speech	Before	the	Twentieth	Annual	Stanford	Directors’	College	(June	23,	2014)	


























These	 areas	 of	 expertise	 gained	 through	 experience—like	 expertise	
gained	 through	education—are	predominantly	quantitative	 in	nature.		
For	that	reason,	the	majority’s	refusal	to	defer	to	the	board’s	expertise	
on	a	matter	 that	was	purely	quantitative	 (i.e.,	 the	 fair	price	 for	Trans	
Union	shares)	was,	to	Justice	McNeilly,	indefensible.78			








dissolve	 corporation);	 see	 generally	 Jill	 Fisch,	 Corporate	 Governance:	 Taking	 Boards	









The	thrust	of	 Justice	McNeilly’s	argument	 is	 that	board	expertise	
is	 at	 its	 zenith—and	 should	 receive	 deference—when	 directors	 are	
called	 upon	 to	make	 a	 decision	 requiring	 quantitative	 analysis.	 	 The	
natural	corollary	to	that	argument,	of	course,	is	that	director	expertise	
is	not	at	its	zenith—and	should	not	be	deferred	to—when	the	decision	
requires	 exploring	 impacts	 that	 are	 non-quantifiable,	 or	 difficult	 to	
quantify.80		That	is	to	say,	this	Article	takes	the	position	that	where	the	
decision	 at	 hand	 requires	 qualitative	 assessments,	 the	 expertise	





The	 Walt	 Disney	 Company	 lost	 its	 president,	 Frank	 Wells,	 in	 a	
helicopter	crash	in	1994.83		In	early	1995,	Disney	CEO,	Michael	Eisner,	
set	 out	 to	 find	 a	 replacement	 and	 settled	 on	 his	 longtime	 friend,	
Michael	S.	Ovitz.84			
Ovitz	 was	 not	 an	 obvious	 choice.85	 	 He	 lacked	 experience	
managing	 a	 diversified	 public	 company	 like	 Disney.86	 	 (His	 primary	
qualifications	seemed	to	be	his	connections	developed	as	an	important	
 
board	 of	 directors”	 is	 somewhat	 surprising	 given	 its	 reluctance	 to	 do	 so	 in	 other	













	 84	 Despite	Eisner’s	 longtime	friendship	with	Ovitz,	 the	Court	did	not	 find	that	the	
fiduciary	 duty	 of	 loyalty	 was	 implicated.	 	 See	 Sean	 J.	 Griffith,	 Good	 Faith	 Business	
Judgment:	 A	 Theory	 of	 Rhetoric	 in	 Corporate	 Law	 Jurisprudence,	 55	 DUKE	 L.J.	 1,	 21	
(2005)	(“The	Eisner-Ovitz	relationship,	however,	falls	short	of	establishing	a	breach	of	
the	duty	of	loyalty.	 	Even	 if	 one	accepts	 that	 a	personal	 relationship	 can	disqualify	 a	








Nevertheless,	 Eisner	 recommended	 him,	 and	 the	 Disney	 board	
acquiesced,	approving	his	employment	agreement.88	
The	 employment	 agreement	 between	 Disney	 and	 Ovitz,	 in	 the	
words	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Delaware,	was	“exceedingly	lucrative,	if	
not	 luxurious,	 compared	 to	Ovitz’	value	 to	 the	Company.”89	 	The	 five-
year	 contract	 gave	Ovitz	 a	 base	 salary	 of	 $1	million,	 and	 two	 sets	 of	
stock	 options	 entitling	 Ovitz	 to	 five	 million	 Disney	 shares	 (worth	 in	
excess	 of	 $80	million	 at	 the	 time).90	 	 The	 stock	options	were	divided	
into	 the	 “A”	 options	 (three	million	 shares);	 and	 the	 “B”	 options	 (two	
million	shares).91	
What	 made	 the	 contract	 “exceedingly	 lucrative”	 is	 that	 the	 “A”	
options	 vested	 immediately	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 no-fault	 termination	 of	
Ovitz.92	 	 In	 addition	 to	 a	 no-fault	 termination	 resulting	 in	 the	
immediate	vesting	of	the	“A”	options,	it	entitled	Ovitz	to	his	remaining	
salary	 payments	 under	 the	 five-year	 agreement,	 a	 $10	 million	
severance	payment,	and	“an	additional	$7.5	million	for	each	fiscal	year	
remaining	under	the	agreement.”93	
In	 deciding	 whether	 to	 approve	 the	 proposed	 employment	
agreement	(which	it	did	on	October	1,	1995),	the	Disney	board	enlisted	
the	 help	 of	 corporate	 compensation	 consultant,	 Graef	 Crystal.94	 	 He	
presumably	 informed	 the	Disney	board	of	much	of	 the	 substance	 set	
forth	 above,	 however,	 by	 his	 own	 admission,	 Mr.	 Crystal	 failed	 to	
inform	 the	 board	 regarding	 “the	 costs	 that	 would	 be	 incurred	 by	
Disney	 in	 the	 event	 Ovitz	 was	 terminated	 from	 the	 Company	 for	 a	
reason	 other	 than	 cause	 prior	 to	 the	 natural	 expiration	 of	 the	 Ovitz	
Employment	Agreement.”95		More	specifically,	it	seems	that	Mr.	Crystal	
did	not	inform	the	board	that	Ovitz	was	actually	incentivized	“to	find	a	
way	 to	 exit	 the	 Company	 via	 a	 non-fault	 termination	 as	 soon	 as	
possible	 because	 doing	 so	 would	 permit	 him	 to	 earn	 more	 than	 he	
could	by	fulfilling	his	contract.”96		And	in	fact,	on	December	27,	1996,	a	















things	 were	 not	 working	 out	 between	 Disney	 and	 Ovitz,97	 Disney	
granted	Ovitz	a	no-fault	 termination	allowing	him	 to	walk	away	with	
$140	million.98	
The	 plaintiff’s	 primary	 allegation	 was	 that	 the	 Disney	 board	 of	
directors	 violated	 its	 fiduciary	 duty	 of	 care	 by	 following	 a	 grossly	
negligent	 decision-making	 process	 and	 otherwise	 failing	 to	 properly	
inform	 itself	when	deciding	 to	approve	 the	employment	agreement.99		
(On	its	face,	the	argument	that	the	business	judgment	rule	is	overcome	
by	 the	 board’s	 failure	 to	 inform	 itself	 seems	 promising,	 especially	 in	
the	wake	 of	 the	 earlier	 Smith	 v.	 Van	 Gorkom	 case	where	 the	 Court’s	




the	 fiduciary	 duty	 of	 care,	 the	 court	 will	 presume	 that	 the	 board’s	
decision	 was	 proper	 and	 dismiss	 the	 action,	 unless	 the	 shareholder	
overcomes	 the	 presumption.101	 	 The	 Court	 further	 stated	 (agreeing	
with	 the	 plaintiffs)	 that	 the	 presumption	 can	 indeed	 be	 overcome	
where	 the	 plaintiff	 shows102	 that	 the	 board	 failed	 to	 follow	 a	 valid	
decision-making	process,	 “measured	by	 concepts	 of	 gross	negligence,	
includ[ing]	 consideration	 of	 all	 material	 information	 reasonably	
available.”103			
Unfortunately	 for	 the	plaintiffs,	 the	Court	 found	 that	 the	board’s	
decision-making	process	was	not	grossly	negligent.104		The	board	took	
months	 to	 make	 the	 decision105	 (not	 two	 hours,	 as	 was	 the	 case	 in	
Smith	v.	Van	Gorkom).106	 	And	during	 that	 time,	 it	hired	and	 relied	 in	
 
	 97	 The	 allegations	 contained	 in	 the	 complaint	 stated	 that	 Ovitz	 exercised	 an	
imperious	management	style	anathema	to	Disney’s	corporate	culture,	refused	to	learn	
about	 Disney’s	 financial	 affairs,	 and	 upon	 realizing	 he	 was	 failing,	 spent	 his	 time	
actively	negotiating	for	an	executive	position	with	SONY,	as	opposed	to	doing	his	job	at	
Disney.	 	 See	 Second	 Amended	 Consolidated	 Derivative	 Complaint	 at	 27,	 Brehm	 v.	






	 102	 Technically,	 because	 Brehm	 was	 a	 derivative	 lawsuit	 where	 no	 demand	 was	
made,	 the	plaintiffs	must	 raise	a	 “reasonable	doubt”	 that	 “the	challenged	 transaction	









board	 getting	 a	 fairness	 opinion	 in	 the	 mergers	 and	 acquisitions	
context).107	 	 With	 no	 lack	 of	 irony,	 it	 is	 Mr.	 Crystal’s	 later	 public	
comments	 about	 the	 failures	 of	 that	 process	 that	 form	 the	 basis	 of	
many	 of	 the	 factual	 allegations	 in	 the	 complaint,	 that	 are	 recounted	
above.108	
As	a	fallback	argument,	the	plaintiffs	alleged	that	the	substance	of	
the	 employment	 contract	 itself	 evidenced	 gross	 negligence,	 which	 it	
characterized	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 “substantive	 due	 care”	 (as	 opposed	 to	
process	due	care).109		The	Court	quickly	disposed	of	that	claim:	
As	 for	 the	 plaintiffs’	 contention	 that	 the	 directors	 failed	 to	
exercise	 “substantive	due	 care,”	we	 should	note	 that	 such	a	
concept	 is	 foreign	 to	 the	business	 judgment	 rule.	 [Pursuant	
to	 the	 rule]	 [c]ourts	 do	 not	 measure,	 weigh	 or	 quantify	
directors’	judgments.	.	.	.	Irrationality	is	the	outer	limit	of	the	




But	 what	 does	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Delaware	 say	 in	Brehm	 v.	
Eisner	about	the	rationale	for	the	business	 judgment	rule?	 	The	Court	
says	 that	 “[a]ny	 other	 rule	 would	 deter	 corporate	 boards	 from	 the	
optimal	 rational	 acceptance	 of	 risk.”111	 	 Interestingly,	while	Brehm	 v.	
Eisner	quotes	Lewis	v.	Vogelstein	 for	the	proposition	that	the	business	
judgment	 rule	 is	 necessary	 to	 encourage	 the	 optimal	 acceptance	 of	
risk,	 that	proposition	can	also	be	 traced	back	 to	Gagliardi	 v.	Trifoods,	
 
	 107	 Brehm,	 746	A.2d	at	259.	 	 In	 so	holding,	 the	Court	 emphasized	 the	 language	of	
Section	141(e)	of	the	Delaware	General	Corporation	Law:	
A	 member	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors,	 or	 a	 member	 of	 any	 committee	
designated	by	 the	board	of	directors,	 shall,	 in	 the	performance	of	 such	





such	 other	 person’s	 professional	 or	 expert	 competence	 and	 who	 has	
been	selected	with	reasonable	care	by	or	on	behalf	of	the	corporation.	
Id.	at	261	n.51	(emphasis	omitted)	(quoting	DEL.	CODE	ANN.	tit.	8,	§	141(e)).		The	Court	








the	 next	 case	we	will	 discuss.112	 	 For	 now,	 it	 suffices	 to	 say	 that	 the	
Disney	 board	 took	 a	 risk	 in	 offering	 a	 lucrative	 contract	 to	 Ovitz	 to	
entice	 him	 away	 from	 being	 Chairman	 of	 Creative	 Artists	 Agency.113		
The	upside	 risk	was	 that	Ovitz	 could	bring	 the	 same	 entrepreneurial	
drive	to	Disney	that	he	used	to	build	one	of	the	most	formidable	talent	
agencies	 in	 the	 United	 States.114	 	 (Apparently	 that	 is	 what	 Eisner	
believed.)	 	Of	course,	 the	downside	risk	was	 that	Ovitz	could	 fail.	 	He	
had	 no	 experience	 as	 the	 president	 of	 a	 public	 company.115	 	 If	 Ovitz	
failed,	 not	 only	would	Disney	 be	 back	 at	 square	 one,	 searching	 for	 a	
president,	but	also	Disney	would	 forfeit	much	 in	 the	way	of	cash	and	
stock.116			
With	 the	 benefit	 of	 hindsight,	 the	 Disney	 board’s	 decision	 may	
seem	 like	 it	was	 foolishly	 risky;	 nevertheless,	 the	Delaware	 Supreme	
Court	 found	 the	 decision	 to	 be	 protected	 by	 the	 business	 judgment	
rule.	 	 I	 believe	 the	 Court	 did	 so	 because	 a	 contrary	 ruling	 would	
discourage	 both	 bad	 (unprofitable)	 and	 good	 (profitable)	 risk-taking.		
And	as	 the	Court	has	stated	elsewhere,	 “[t]he	business	 judgment	rule	








	 113	 The	 Internal	 Disney	 Memo	 regarding	 the	 matter	 stated	 “[i]t	 is	 necessary	 and	
appropriate	 to	 provide	 [Ovitz]	with	 downside	 protection	 and	 upside	 opportunity	 to	
compensate	to	the	extent	feasible	for	[the	loss	of]	the	very	successful	business	he	will	
abandon.”	 	 Opening	 Brief	 of	 the	 Walt	 Disney	 Co.	 and	 the	 Director	 Defendants	 in	
Support	of	Their	Motion	 to	Dismiss	 at	9,	Brehm	v.	Eisner,	 746	A.2d	244	 (Del.	 2000)	
(No.	 15452),	 https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/8289-a	 (quoting	 Internal	 Disney	
Memo	 dated	 July	 7,	 1995).	 	 Indeed,	 the	Disney	 Board	 feared	 that	 absent	 a	 lucrative	
compensation	package,	they	could	not	attract	Ovitz.		Id.	
	 114	 Id.	 	 (discussing	 the	 need	 to	 attract	 a	 “highly	 successful	 and	 unique	
entrepreneur”).	
	 115	 Brehm,	746	A.2d	at	249.	
	 116	 Id.	 at	 250.	 	 And	 of	 course,	 forfeiting	 much	 cash	 and	 stock	 is	 exactly	 what	
happened.	 	 Ovitz	 was	 paid	 $38,888,230.77	 in	 cash,	 and	 stock	 options	 worth	
$101,000,000.00.		Id.	at	252–53.	
	 117	 Trenwick	 Am.	 Litig.	 Tr.	 v.	 Ernst	 &	 Young,	 L.L.P.,	 906	 A.2d	 168,	 193	 (Del.	 Ch.	
2006);	see	Bainbridge,	supra	note	26	at	110	(The	business	judgment	rule	is	necessary	
to	avoid	“the	risk	of	stifling	innovation	and	venturesome	business	activity.”)	(quoting	





In	1993,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	TriFoods	 International,	 Inc.	was	 in	
financial	trouble	and	that	action	was	necessary	to	return	the	company	
to	profitability.118	 	Eugene	Gagliardi,	 the	founder	and	Chairman	of	the	
Board	 of	 TriFoods,	 favored	 a	 conservative	 plan	 of	 action;	 TriFoods’	
President,	Hart,	and	the	remainder	of	the	board	of	directors,	favored	a	
more	 risky	plan	 of	 action.119	 	 The	more	 risky	plan	 of	 action	 involved	
taking	on	a	 large	amount	of	debt	to	build	and	fit-out	a	new	factory	to	
manufacture	 the	 products	 itself—rather	 than	 sub-contracting	 with	 a	
third	party—and	the	purchase	of	several	new	food	lines:	Steak-umms	
and	Lloyd’s	Ribs.120	
The	 debate	 regarding	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 company	 became	
contentious,	and	after	a	power	struggle,	Gagliardi	was	ousted	from	his	
position	 as	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Board	 and	 his	 employment	 by	 TriFoods	
was	 terminated.121	 	 Although	 he	 retained	 his	 thirteen	 percent	
ownership	 interest	 in	 the	 company,	 those	 shares	were	 insufficient	 to	
influence	company	direction.122	
Gagliardi	 brought	 a	 lawsuit	 against	 Hart	 and	 the	 board	 of	
directors	for	breach	of	their	 fiduciary	duty	of	care.123	 	He	alleged	that	




Unsurprisingly,	 Chancellor	 Allen	 dismissed	 the	 fiduciary	 duty	
action.126	 	He	 stated	 that	 the	board	of	 directors	 of	TriFoods	was	 in	 a	




a	 lawful	 transaction,	 within	 the	 corporation’s	 powers,	
authorized	 by	 a	 corporate	 fiduciary	 acting	 in	 a	 good	 faith	
pursuit	 of	 corporate	 purposes,	 does	 not	 state	 a	 claim	 for	
 













relief	 against	 that	 fiduciary	 no	 matter	 how	 foolish	 the	
investment	may	appear	in	retrospect.128	
That	 is	 true	even	if	 the	board’s	decision	was	“foolishly	risky!	stupidly	
risky!	egregiously	risky!	—	you	supply	the	adverb.”129	
What	 is	 most	 instructive	 about	 Chancellor	 Allen’s	 decision	 in	
Gagliardi	v.	TriFoods	is	how	deeply	he	discusses	the	optimal	risk-taking	
rationale	for	the	business	judgment	rule.130		Chancellor	Allen’s	decision	
itself	 could	 double	 as	 a	 law	 review	 article	 on	 the	 important	 role	 the	
business	 judgment	 rule	 plays	 in	 encouraging	 optimal	 risk-taking.131		
This	 optimal	 risk-taking	 rationale	 for	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	
would	 later	 be	 picked	 up	 in	 Lewis	 v.	 Vogelstein	 and	 then	 Brehm	 v.	
Eisner.132		
Chancellor	Allen’s	decision	points	out	 that	a	 shareholder	prefers	
risky	 projects	 because	 the	 potential	 gain	 is	 high,	 while	 the	 potential	
loss	 is	 capped.133	 	 Even	 if	 the	 risky	 project	 fails	 and	 results	 in	 the	
corporation’s	 insolvency,	 the	 corporate	 liability	 shield	 limits	 the	
shareholder’s	 loss	 to	 her	 initial	 investment,	 no	 more.134	 	 Second,	




Prominent	 scholarship	 supports	 Chancellor	 Allen’s	 view.137		
Professor	Bainbridge	suggests	that	shareholders	consent	to	risk-taking	
by	directors—and	agree	to	limitations	on	their	ability	to	bring	lawsuits	
when	 such	 risks	 turn	 out	 badly—precisely	 because	 they	 benefit	 fully	
from	 the	upside	 risk	while	 limiting	 their	 downside	 risk.138	 	He	 states	
that	 if	 they	 were	 able,	 shareholders	 would	 contractually	 agree	 “to	
refrain	 from	 challenging	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 managerial	 business	



















preclude	 this,	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 intercedes	 to	 impliedly	
create	the	contract	the	parties	would	otherwise	expressly	create.140			
Broader	 society	 too	 benefits	 from	 the	 corporate	 risk-taking	 that	
the	business	judgment	rule	fosters.141		Alan	Palmiter	writes,	“[l]iability	
standards	that	risk	 introducing	timidity	 in	 the	boardroom	could	have	
enormous	 costs	 .	.	.	 to	 society	 in	 general.”142	 	 Professors	 Hu	 and	
Westbrook	 list	 “bet	 the	 company”	 projects	 that	 benefited	 society,	
including	 “Boeing	 having	 bet	the	 company	 on	 the	 707,	 the	 first	
commercial	 jet	 airplane,	 [and]	 IBM	 having	 .	.	.	 spen[t]	more	 than	 the	
cost	of	the	Manhattan	Project––to	develop	the	IBM	360.”143			
The	final	point	made	by	Chancellor	Allen	in	Gagliardi	v.	TriFoods	is	
that	 the	business	 judgment	 rule	 aligns	 the	 risk	 tolerance	of	directors	
with	 the	 risk	 tolerance	 of	 shareholders.144	 	 (The	 business	 judgment	
rule’s	downside	risk	protection	makes	it	more	likely	that	directors	will	
take	 the	 risk	 shareholders	 prefer.145)	 	 This	 is	 especially	 necessary	
when	one	considers	that,	unlike	shareholders,	directors	do	not	share	in	
the	 upside	 risk	 (financial	 benefit).	 	 That	 is	 because,	 as	 the	 Court	 of	
Chancery	points	out	in	Gagliardi	v.	TriFoods,	directors	have	a	relatively	
small	claim	in	the	residual	profits.146		
And	so,	absent	 the	protection	of	 the	business	 judgment	 rule,	 the	
directors’	share	of	any	downside	loss	is	large,	while	their	share	of	any	
upside	gain	is	small.147		Chancellor	Allen	explains	that	“[i]f	.	.	.	corporate	
directors	 were	 to	 be	 found	 liable	 for	 a	 corporate	 loss	 from	 a	 risky	
project	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 the	 investment	 was	 too	 risky	 .	.	.	 their	
liability	would	be	joint	and	several	for	the	whole	loss	(with	I	suppose	a	
right	 of	 contribution).”148	 	 In	 short,	 absent	 the	 protection	 of	 the	





















favor	 of	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 is	 deference	 to	 the	 board	 of	
directors’	 business	 expertise.150	 	 This	 argument	 is	 especially	
compelling	when	the	directors	are	valuing	a	company	for	sale,	as	was	
the	case	in	Van	Gorkom.151			
Related	 Question	 1.	 	 Shareholders	 may	 be	 willing	 to	 defer	 to	
director	decisions	where	they	have	special	expertise—such	as	valuing	
a	 company	 for	 sale—but	 are	 they	 willing	 to	 defer	 in	 areas	 where	
directors	 do	 not	 have	 special	 expertise,	 such	 as	 climate	 change	 or	
human	rights?			
Conclusion	 2.	 As	 illustrated	 in	 Brehm	 and	 Gagliardi,	 the	 second	
argument	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 is	 that	 it	 allows	






shareholders	 prefer	 risk-taking	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 decisions	 that	
implicate	 their	 own	 health	 and	 safety?	 	 What	 if	 the	 risk-taking	
implicates	third-party	health	and	safety?	
III.		SIGNIFICANT	SOCIAL	POLICY	ISSUES		





we	do	not	need	to	reinvent	 the	wheel.	 	 In	 this	part,	 I	will	explore	the	
definition	of	“significant	social	policy	issue”	used	by	the	Securities	and	
Exchange	Commission	(SEC).	
First,	 one	 point	 of	 clarification:	 I	 am	 not	 proposing	 that	 federal	
law	 should	 control	 state	 law	 on	 this	matter.	 	 I	 am	 simply	 suggesting	
 

















shareholder	 proposals,	 Exchange	 Act	 Rule	 14a-8.155	 	 Promulgated	 by	
the	SEC,	the	main	thrust	of	14a-8	is	that,	when	a	shareholder	submits	a	
proposal,156	the	corporation	must	include	that	proposal	in	their	proxy	
materials	 and	 allow	 it	 to	 be	 voted	 on	 at	 their	 annual	meeting,	unless	
there	 is	a	valid	reason	to	exclude	 it.157	 	One	valid	reason	to	exclude	a	
shareholder	 proposal	 is	 that	 it	 intrudes	 on	 the	 ordinary	 business	
operations	 of	 the	 corporation.	 	 This	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 “ordinary	
business	operations	exclusion.”158	
The	ordinary	business	operations	exclusion	is	silent	as	to	whether	





applied	 to	 a	 proposal—even	 one	 that	 intrudes	 on	 ordinary	 business	
operations—if	 it	 also	 raises	 a	 significant	 social	 policy	 issue	 that	




	 154	 For	 example,	 the	 federal	 interpretation	 of	 “investment	 contract”	 is	 borrowed	
from	state	“blue	sky”	laws.		See	SEC	v.	W.J.	Howey,	Co.,	328	U.S.	293,	298	(1946).	
	 155	 17	C.F.R.	§	240.14a-8	(2020).	







	 161	 See	 Adoption	 of	 Amendments	 Relating	 to	 Proposals	 by	 Security	 Holders,	
Exchange	 Act	 Release	 No.	 12,999,	 1976	 SEC	 LEXIS	 326,	 *31–32	 (Nov.	 22,	 1976)	
[hereinafter	1976	Adopting	Release]	(stating	that	the	exclusion	should	not	be	applied	
to	 matters	 that	 have	 “significant	 policy	 .	.	.	 implications	 inherent	 in	 them”);	
Amendments	 to	 Rules	 on	 Shareholder	 Proposals,	 Exchange	 Act	 Release	 No.	 39,093,	
1997	SEC	LEXIS	1962,	*49–50	(Sept.	26,	1997)	[hereinafter	1997	Proposing	Release]	


























can	 use	 to	 further	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 significant	 social	 policy	
exception	 to	 the	ordinary	business	operations	 exclusion.163	 	 Consider	
the	 following	 releases	 (these	 releases	 are	 important	 because,	 absent	
regulatory	 text,	 they	 are	 the	 first	 place	 bench	 and	 bar	 look	 for	
guidance):		
• 1976	 Release.	 	 The	 SEC	 stated	 that	 going	 forward	 the	
ordinary	business	operations	exclusion	may	not	be	used	




• 1997	Release.	 	The	SEC	reaffirmed	 that	going	 forward	 the	
ordinary	business	operations	exclusion	may	not	be	used	





Rule 14a-8 requires that 
shareholder proposals be 
included in the corporate 
proxy for vote at the annual 
meeting.
Rule 14a-8(i)(7) allows 
exclusion of the proposal 
where it "deals with a matter 
relating to the company’s 
ordinary business operations.”
But the shareholder proposal 
cannot be excluded if it raises 
a significant social policy issue 












request	 a	 “no-action”	 letter	 from	 the	 SEC	 staff	 .	.	.	.	 	 [I]f	 the	
staff	 grants	 the	 request	 for	 no	 action	 [the	 letter	 will	 state]	
that	the	SEC	staff	would	not	recommend	that	the	Commission	
take	enforcement	action	against	 the	 requester	based	on	 the	
facts	 and	 representations	 described	 in	 the	 [person’s]	
request.168	
The	 SEC	 also	 writes,	 “[m]ost	 no-action	 letters	 describe	 the	 request,	
analyze	the	particular	facts	and	circumstances	involved,	[and]	discuss	
applicable	laws	and	rules	 .	.	.	.”169	 	Unfortunately,	the	last	two	features	
are	 regularly	 absent	 from	 no-action	 letters	 regarding	 exclusion	 of	
shareholder	proposals.170		Most	no-action	letters	simply	states	whether	





is	 tied	 to	 a	 social	 issue	will	 no	 longer	be	viewed	as	 removing	 the	proposal	 from	 the	
realm	 of	 ordinary	 business	 operations	 of	 the	 registrant.”	 	 Id.	 at	 *43–44.	 	 After	
comment,	 it	 adopted	 the	 proposal	 six	 months	 later.	 	 See	 Amendments	 To	 Rules	 On	
Shareholder	Proposals,	Exchange	Act	Release	No.	34-40018,	1998	SEC	LEXIS	1001,	*15	
(May	21,	1998)	(“We	are	adopting	our	proposal	to	reverse	the	Cracker	Barrel	position,	
which	 provided	 that	 all	 employment-related	 shareholder	 proposals	 raising	 social	
policy	 issues	would	be	excludable	under	the	 ‘ordinary	business’	exclusion.”);	see	also	
Selected	 Labor	 and	Employment	 Law	Updates,	 1	U.	PA.	 J.	LAB.	&	EMP.	L.	 789,	 790–91	
(1998)	 (“Proposals	 relating	 to	 ‘ordinary	 business’	 subject	 matters	 such	 as	
employment,	 but	 focusing	 on	 sufficiently	 significant	 social	 policy	 issues	 (e.g.,	




	 167	 See	 Trinity,	 792	 F.3d	 at	 330–31	 (discussing	 how	 the	 no-action	 letter	 process	
applies	in	the	context	of	Rule	14a-8	shareholder	proposals).	
	 168	 No	 Action	 Letters,	 U.S.	 SEC.	 &	 EXCH.	 COMM’N,	 https://www.investor.gov/
introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/no-action-letters	 (last	 visited	 Feb.	
10,	2021).	
	 169	 Id.	






identify	 categories	 of	 proposals	 that	 the	 SEC	 believes	 implicate	
transcendent	 significant	 social	 issues—and	 thus,	 should	 not	 be	
excluded—including,	 but	 not	 limited	 to,	 climate	 change	 and	 human	
rights.172			
B.		Climate	Change	
The	 1997	 Release,	 discussed	 above,	 made	 clear	 that	 building	 a	




likewise,	 implicate	 significant	 social	 policy	 issues?	 	 In	 2011,	 the	 SEC	









debate	 regarding	 an	 issue	 is	 among	 the	 factors	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 determining	
whether	 proposals	 concerning	 that	 issue	 ‘transcend	 the	 day-to-day	 business	
matters.’”)	(internal	citation	omitted).	
	 172	 See	 Trinity,	 792	 F.3d	 at	 342–43	 (using	 no-action	 letters	 to	 determine	 the	
boundaries	of	the	exclusion);	Steel,	supra	note	170,	at	1549	(describing	how	no-action	
letters	 are	 imperfect	 tools	 for	 determining	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 ordinary	 business	
operations	exclusion).	
	 173	 1976	Adopting	Release,	 supra	 note	161,	 at	 *31–32;	 see	Northern	States	Power	
Co.,	 SEC	 Staff	 No-Action	 Letter,	 1998	 SEC	 No-Act.	 LEXIS	 168,	 at	 *1	 (Feb.	 9,	 1998)	





Letter,	 1993	 SEC	 No-Act.	 LEXIS	 87,	 *2	 (Jan.	 26,	 1993)	 (denying	 no-action	 relief	 for	












The	 SEC	 took	 the	 position	 that	 the	 proposal	 should	 not	 be	
excluded,	 stating	 that	 “the	 determination	 whether	 to	 .	.	.	 develop[]	
renewable	 energy	 generating	 systems	 [is	 a]	 significant	 policy	
issue[].”177		This	is	not	surprising,	as	climate	change,	and	the	significant	
role	 played	 by	 the	 energy	 sector,	 has	 generated	 widespread	 public	
debate	over	the	past	three	decades.178		The	debate	has	shifted	back	and	
forth,	 and	 then	back	 again.	 	 The	United	 States	 signed	onto	 the	Kyoto	
Protocol	 in	 1997	 and	 then	 withdrew	 in	 2001;179	 the	 United	 States	
signed	 onto	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 in	 2015,	 then	withdrew	 in	 2020,180	
and	then	rejoined	in	2021.181	
In	 a	 separate	 matter,	 the	 SEC	 Staff	 took	 the	 position	 that	 a	
shareholder	 proposal	 requesting	 a	 report	 explaining	 how	 an	 energy	
company’s	 business	 will	 be	 impacted	 by	 climate	 change	 is	 not	
excludable.182	 	 The	 SEC	 Staff	 reasoned	 that	 the	 proposal	 is	 not	
 




of	Directors	 to:	 be	open	and	honest	with	us	 about	 the	 enormous	 costs	
and	risks	of	new	nuclear	construction;	invest	in	demand	control	and	new	
renewable	 generation	 sources	 for	 the	 safest	 and	 quickest	 returns	 to	
shareholders,	stakeholders,	community	and	country;	and	therefore,	stop	










	 180	 Lisa	 Friedman	 &	 Somini	 Sengupta,	 Despite	 U.S.	 Exit,	 World	 Moves	 Ahead	 on	
Climate	Pact,	N.Y.	TIMES,	Nov.	5,	2020,	at	A10.		While	President	Trump	broadcasted	his	
intent	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 in	 2016,	 the	 United	 States	 could	 not	
legally	withdraw	until	2020.	 	Marc	Zemel,	The	Rise	of	Rights-Based	Climate	Litigation	
and	Germany’s	Susceptibility	to	Suit,	29	FORDHAM	ENV’T	L.	REV.	484,	486	(2018).	
	 181	 Paris	 Climate	 Agreement,	 WHITE	 HOUSE	 (Jan.	 20,	 2021),	 https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/paris-climate-
agreement/.	










Generally,	 the	 position	 of	 the	 SEC	 Staff	 is	 that	 shareholder	
proposals	 involving	human	 rights	 implicate	 a	 significant	 social	policy	
issue.184	 	 But	 there	 are	 many	 categories	 here.	 	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 two:	
human	 rights	 problems	 in	 the	 supply	 chain	 (usually	 in	 the	 form	 of	
suppliers	using	forced-	or	child-labor),	and	actions	that	infringe	on	free	
speech	and	free	association.			
Nucor	 Corporation	 is	 a	 steel	 producer,	 a	 component	 of	which	 is	
pig	 iron.185	 	 The	 company	 faced	 scrutiny	 in	 2006	when	 the	 financial	
press	 revealed	 that	 Nucor	 was	 purchasing	 pig	 iron	 produced	 using	
forced	labor.186		Shareholders	were	rightly	concerned.		They	brought	a	























	 187	 Nucor	 Corp.,	 SEC	 Staff	 No-Action	 Letter,	 2008	 SEC	No-Act.	 LEXIS	 372,	 at	 *4–5	
(Mar.	6,	2008).		The	actual	proposal	read:	
Shareholders	 request	 the	 Board	 of	 Directors	 to	 review	 the	 company’s	
policies	and	practices	related	to	its	global	operations	and	supply	chain	to	
assess	 areas	 where	 the	 company	 needs	 to	 adopt	 and	 implement	
additional	policies	to	ensure	the	protection	of	fundamental	human	rights	






The	 SEC	 Staff	 took	 the	 position	 that	 Nucor	 should	 include	 the	
proposal	 in	 its	 proxy	 materials	 and	 allow	 it	 to	 go	 to	 a	 shareholder	
vote.189		While	the	SEC	Staff	provided	no	reasoning	for	its	position,	it	is	
worth	noting	that	the	proponents	emphasized	that	a	proposal	must	be	
included	 in	 proxy	materials	 if	 it	 implicates	 a	 significant	 social	 policy	
issue	 (and	 this	 is	 a	 position	 that	 the	 SEC	 Staff,	 by	 denying	 Nucor’s	
request	 for	no-action	relief,	apparently	agreed	with).190	 	The	outcome	
is	 not	 surprising.	 	 Forced	 labor	 in	 supply	 chains	 has	 been,	 and	
continues	to	be,	a	source	of	widespread	public	debate.191	
Abercrombie	 &	 Fitch	 (“A&F”)	 is	 a	 clothes	 retailer	 that	 sources	
much	 of	 its	 merchandise	 in	 Asia	 and	 South	 America.192	 	 It	 faced	
negative	 press	 when	 it	 settled	 a	 lawsuit	 brought	 by	 workers	 “who	
alleged	 they	 were	 mistreated	 while	 they	 worked	 for	 [one	 of	 A&F’s]	
vendors.”193	 	The	shareholder	proposal	 in	question	required	that	A&F	
adopt	 and	 enforce	 a	 vendor	 code	 of	 conduct	 to	 protect	 the	 human	









Labor,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Jan.	 8,	 2021),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/business/
economy/china-solar-companies-forced-labor-xinjiang.html.	




	 195	 Id.	at	*1–2.	 	The	SEC	seems	willing	to	allow	shareholder	proposals	that	require	
corporations	to	prepare	reports	or	implement	policies	to	protect	human	rights	in	the	



















being	 complicit	 in	 China’s	 censorship	 of	 its	 own	 citizens.199		
Specifically,	Apple	removed	anti-censorship	tools	from	its	App	Store	in	
China.200	 	 It	 had	also	 (in)famously	 removed	 the	New	York	Times	app	
from	its	App	Store	in	China	after	being	pressured	by	Beijing.201	
When	 an	 Apple	 shareholder,	 upset	 by	 these	 occurrences,	
submitted	 for	 vote	 at	 the	 annual	 meeting	 a	 proposal	 that	 required	
Apple	 to	 set	 up	 a	 human	 rights	 committee,	 the	 SEC	 held	 that	 the	
company	could	not	exclude	the	proposal	because	it	dealt	with	a	matter	
of	ethical	and	social	significance.202		In	refusing	to	allow	the	proposal	to	
be	 excluded,	 the	 SEC	 staff	 reasoned	 that	 Apple	 admitted	 that	 “the	
Board	 and	 management	 firmly	 believe	 that	 human	 rights	 are	 an	
integral	component	of	the	Company’s	business	operations,”	and	utterly	





No	 information	 technology	products	or	 technologies	will	be	










	 200	 Paul	Mozur,	 Joining	 Apple,	 Amazon’s	 China	 Cloud	 Service	 Bows	 to	 Censors,	 N.Y.	
TIMES	 (Aug.	 1,	 2017),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/business/amazon-
china-internet-censors-apple.html	(“Days	after	Apple	yanked	anti-censorship	tools	off	




	 203	 Id.	 (internal	 quotations	 omitted).	 	 As	 to	 the	 second	 comment,	 it	 is	 an	
understatement.		As	I	have	discussed	elsewhere:	
In	 an	 oddly	 out-of-touch	 rebuttal	 to	Mr.	 Zhao,	 Apple’s	 attorneys	 spent	
many	pages	of	its	letter	to	the	SEC	Staff	explaining	that	human	rights	is	a	
day-to-day	 management	 concern	 at	 Apple,	 but	 focused	 on	 how	 Apple	
furthers	human	 rights	 through	environmental	protection.	 	Apple	never	










access	 or	 use	 of	 the	 Internet	 or	 electronic	 communications	
for	free	speech	and	free	association	purposes.205	
The	 SEC	 Staff	 refused	 to	 concur	 that	 it	 could	 be	 excluded,	 because	 it	
“focuses	on	the	significant	policy	issue	of	human	rights.”206	
D.		Indiscriminate	Weapons	
Weapons	 that	 may	 cause	 unnecessary	 suffering	 or	 have	
indiscriminate	effects	(“indiscriminate	weapons”)	are	not	illegal	per	se,	
and	 thus	 they	 can	 be	 manufactured,	 although	 doing	 so	 obviously	
implicates	 significant	 social	 policy	 issues.207	 	 Indiscriminate	weapons	
include	 napalm	 (which	 causes	 horrific	 burns)	 and	 cluster	 munitions	
(which	kill	indiscriminately,	even	after	the	end	of	the	conflict).208	 	The	
landmark	 case	here	 is	Medical	 Committee	 for	Human	Rights	 v.	 SEC.209		
That	case	involved	the	Medical	Committee	for	Human	Rights	(“Medical	
Committee”),	 which	 had	 received	 several	 shares	 of	 Dow	 Chemical,	
submitting	the	following	shareholder	proposal:	
RESOLVED,	 that	 the	 shareholders	 of	 the	 Dow	 Chemical	
Company	 request	 the	 Board	 of	 Directors	 [amend	 the]	




The	Medical	 Committee	 gave	 the	 following	 reasons	 in	 support	 of	 the	
proposal:	
[W]e	 wish	 to	 note	 that	 our	 objections	 to	 the	 sale	 of	 this	
product	[are]	primarily	based	on	the	concerns	for	human	life	
inherent	 in	 our	 organization’s	 credo.	 	 However,	 we	 are	
further	 informed	 by	 our	 investment	 advisers	 that	 this	
product	is	also	bad	for	our	company’s	business	as	it	is	being	
used	 in	 the	Vietnamese	War.	 	 It	 is	now	clear	 from	company	












recruit	 the	 highly	 intelligent,	 well-motivated,	 young	 college	
men	so	important	for	company	growth.		There	is,	as	well,	an	
adverse	 impact	 on	 our	 global	 business,	 which	 our	 advisers	
indicate,	 suffers	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 public	 reaction	 to	 this	
product.211	
Dow	 sought	 to	 exclude	 the	 proposal	 as	 interfering	 with	 its	 ordinary	
business	 operations,	 and	 the	 SEC	 acquiesced,	 granting	 no-action	
relief.212		Thereafter,	the	Medical	Committee	sought	review	of	the	SEC’s	
decision.		
The	 D.C.	 Circuit	 Court	 found	 serious	 problems	 with	 the	 SEC	
decision,	 finding	 that	 the	 SEC	 acquiesced	 in	 a	 “very	 dubious	 legal	
theory.”213	 	 Specifically,	 the	 Court	 said	 it	 could	 find	 no	 detailed	
discussion	in	the	record	of	why	the	proposal	interfered	with	ordinary	
business	 operations	 (interestingly,	 the	 Court	 stated	 that	 such	 an	
argument	 would	 need	 to	 be	 premised	 on	 what	 ordinary	 business	
operations	means	for	purposes	of	state	law).214			
Further,	 the	 Court	 emphasized	 that	 the	 proposal	 raised	 a	
significant	social	policy	issue.		The	Court	stated:		
management	may	[not]	properly	place	obstacles	 in	 the	path	
of	 shareholders	who	wish	 to	 present	 to	 their	 co-owners	 .	.	.	
the	question	of	whether	they	wish	to	have	their	assets	used	
in	 a	 manner	 which	 they	 believe	 to	 be	 more	 socially	





“enlightened	 determination	 of	whether	 enforcement	 action	would	 be	
appropriate.”217	
At	that	point	Dow	saw	the	writing	on	the	wall.	 	 In	January	1971,	















Since	 that	 time,	 matters	 involving	 indiscriminate	 weapons	 have	
generally	 been	 includable	 in	 proxy	 statements	 because	 they	 raise	 a	
significant	 social	 policy	 issue.219	 	 In	 1988,	 Honeywell	 came	 under	
scrutiny	from	its	 investors,	who	were	troubled	by	claims	“that	cluster	
bombs	made	by	Honeywell	 ‘lie	unexploded	 in	Lebanon	and	Southeast	
Asia,	 waiting	 to	 maim	 curious	 schoolchildren	 .	.	.	.’”220	 	 The	
shareholders	 were	 concerned	 that,	 regardless	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 the	
accusations,	 “the	 Company	 is	 the	 target	 of	 at	 least	 two	 public	
vilification	 and	 pillory	 campaigns	 which	 could	 impact	 its	 public	
relations,	its	ability	to	recruit	engineers	and	executives[,]	and	its	ability	




of	civilian	products).222	 	Honeywell	 sought	 to	exclude	 the	proposal	as	





Here,	 I	 will	 explain	 why	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 should	 not	
apply	 to	 decisions	 that	 implicate	 the	 significant	 social	 policy	 issues	
highlighted	 in	 Part	 III.	 	 To	 help	 illustrate	 my	 point,	 I	 will	 use	 the	
hypothetical	 of	 a	 board’s	 decision	 to	 build	 a	 power	 generation	plant,	
which	 implicates	 the	 significant	 social	 policy	 issue	 of	 climate	 change	












	 224	 Id.	 at	 *1.	 	An	 interesting	note,	 in	2001,	General	Electric	 received	 the	 following	
proposal	 from	 shareholders:	 “RESOLVED	 that	 the	 shareholders	 request	 GE	










Imagine	 a	 situation	 where	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 of	 a	 utility	
company	must	 decide	what	 kind	 of	 power	 generation	 plant	 to	 build.		
The	board	is	free	to	choose	among	the	available	alternatives:	retaining	
the	 status	 quo	 (no	 new	 plant);	 coal-fired	 or	 natural	 gas-fired	 (which	
would	 contribute	 to	 climate	 change);	 or	 solar,	wind,	 or	 hydroelectric	
(which	would	not	contribute	to	climate	change).225	 	Now	assume	that	
after	 deliberation,	 the	 directors	 decide	 to	 construct	 a	 new	 coal-fired	
power	generation	plant.			
Thereafter,	 a	 group	 of	 shareholders	 seek	 an	 injunction.	 	 They	
claim	that	the	board	of	directors	violated	its	fiduciary	duty	of	care.226	
Such	 an	 action	 would	 almost	 certainly	 be	 dismissed	 under	 the	
business	judgment	rule.		The	decision	to	expand	or	build	a	new	power	
generation	 plant	 is	 a	 quintessential	 business	 judgment.227	 	 A	 close	
analogy	 would	 be	 the	 important	 case	 of	 Dodge	 v.	 Ford,	 where	 the	





	 226	 While	 I	 am	 unaware	 of	 any	 such	 cases	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 such	 a	 case	 was	
recently	 filed	 in	 Poland.	 	 See	 Alice	 Garton,	 Marcin	 Stoczkiewicz	 &	 Peter	 Barnett,	
Briefing,	 Ostrołęka	 C:	 Energa’s	 and	 Enea’s	 Board	 Members’	 Fiduciary	 Duties	 to	 the	






factory	 or	 enter	 into	 a	 new	 line	 of	 business	 .	.	.	 falls	 squarely	 within	 the	 board’s	
control.”);	Thomas	Joo,	Global	Warming	and	the	Management-Centered	Corporation,	44	
WAKE	 FOREST	 L.	 REV.	 671,	 680	 (2009)	 (“Regardless	 of	 whether	 it	 would	 be	 a	 poor	
business	 judgment	 to	 forego	 the	 ‘green’	market,	 it	 would	 nonetheless	 be	 a	business	
judgment	and	 as	 such	 it	 would	 not	 be	 actionable	 by	 shareholders	 under	 state	






Japanese	 equivalent	 to	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule.	 	 See	 J.	 Mark	 Ramseyer,	Nuclear	
Power	and	the	Mob:	Extortion	in	Japan,	13	J.	EMPIRICAL	LEGAL	STUD.	487,	500	(2016);	see	
also	 Shiro	Kawashima	&	 Susumu	 Sakurai,	Shareholder	Derivative	 Litigation	 in	 Japan:	
Law,	Practice,	and	Suggested	Reforms,	33	STAN.	J	INT’L	L.	9,	43	(1997)	(“In	Chubu	Electric	








We	must	remember,	however,	 that	 “the	 ‘business	 judgment’	 rule	
is	a	 judicial	creation,”230	and	each	exception	to	the	business	judgment	
rule	is	likewise	a	judicial	creation.231		It	would	be	entirely	proper	for	a	
court	 to	 hold	 that	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 does	 not	 shield	 the	
decision	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 where	 it	 implicates	 a	 significant	
social	policy	issue	based	on	two	interrelated	arguments:	
	
Argument	 1.	 	 Shareholder	 expectations	 define	 the	 “ends”	 of	 the	
fiduciary	 duty	 of	 care.	 	 For	 regular	 decisions	 (those	 that	 do	 not	
implicate	 a	 significant	 social	 policy	 issue),	 shareholders	 expect	
directors	 to	 choose	 the	 course	 of	 action	 that	 maximizes	 financial	
return.		For	decisions	that	do	implicate	a	significant	social	policy	issue	
(such	as	(1)	the	environment	and/or	(2)	human	rights),	the	“ends”	will	
be	 more	 nuanced.	 	 (For	 example,	 shareholders	 may	 expect	 that	
directors	maximize	 financial	 return,	but	not	at	 the	expense	of	 (1)	 the	
environmental	and/or	(2)	human	rights.232)	
	
Argument	 2.	 	 If	 the	 “ends”	 of	 the	 fiduciary	 duty	 of	 care	 are	 more	
nuanced	 (i.e.,	 shareholders	 expect	 that	 directors	 do	 more	 than	 look	
beyond	maximization	 of	 returns),	 then	 it	 is	 not	 appropriate	 to	 apply	
the	business	 judgment	rule	because	 (1)	directors	do	not	have	special	







Vote,	 29	 DEL.	 J.	 CORP.	 L.	 175,	 182	 (2004)	 (“Despite	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule’s	
evidentiary	burden	on	the	moving	party,	the	protections	of	the	business	judgment	rule	
are	not	absolute,	and	there	are	some	court-created	exceptions	to	the	general	rule.”).	
	 232	 See	 infra	 Section	 IV.A.	 	 Interestingly,	 one	 could	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 no	 conflict	
between	 maximizing	 profits	 and	 avoiding	 harm	 to	 the	 environment	 (or,	 for	 that	
matter,	 avoiding	 human	 rights	 abuses).	 	 See	 David	 B.	 Spence,	 Corporate	 Social	
Responsibility	in	the	Oil	and	Gas	Industry:	The	Importance	of	Reputational	Risk,	86	CHI.-
KENT	L.	REV.	 59,	68	 (2011)	 (“Customers	may	be	willing	 to	pay	a	premium	 for	 ‘green’	
electricity	or	oil	that	comes	from	a	relatively	green	oil	company	.	.	.	.”);	Truzaar	Dordi	&	
Olaf	Weber,	The	Impact	of	Divestment	Announcements	on	the	Share	Price	of	Fossil	Fuel	









The	 generally	 accepted	 version	 of	 the	 fiduciary	 duty	 of	 care	
requires	 that	 directors	 use	 appropriate	 means	 (e.g.,	 fully	 informing	
themselves	prior	 to	making	 the	decision)	 toward	accepted	ends	 (e.g.,	
maximizing	 return	 to	 shareholders).235	 	 If	 the	 accepted	 end	 in	 this	
means-ends	 analysis	 is	 maximizing	 return	 to	 shareholders,	 then	
business	judgment	rule	deference	makes	sense.		After	all,	as	discussed	
in	 Part	 II,	 directors	 are	 uniquely	 equipped	 to	 assess	which	 course	 of	
action	will	maximize	returns	to	shareholders.			
However,	 the	 foregoing	 begs	 a	 fundamental	 question:	 why	 is	
maximizing	return	to	shareholders	the	accepted	end?		The	most	likely	
explanation	 is	 that	 because	 shareholders	 invest	 to	make	money.	 	 As	
stated	 in	 Dodge	 v.	 Ford,	 maximizing	 returns	 to	 shareholders	 is	
consistent	with	those	shareholders’	“just	expectations.”236		Specifically,	





Ford,	 “to	 spread	 the	benefits	of	 this	 industrial	 system	 to	 the	greatest	
possible	number	.	.	.	.”).238	
The	 same	 idea—that	 shareholder	 expectations	 set	 the	 proper	
ends	 for	 purposes	 of	 our	 means-ends	 analysis—is	 reflected	 in	 later	
work	 by	 Berle	 and	 Means.239	 	 In	 their	 landmark	 book,	 The	 Modern	
 
	 234	 See	infra	Section	IV.D.	
	 235	 Dodge	 v.	 Ford	 Motor	 Co.,	 170	 N.W.	 668,	 684	 (Mich.	 1919)	 (“A	 business	
corporation	 is	 organized	 and	 carried	 on	primarily	 for	 the	profit	 of	 the	 stockholders.		
The	 powers	 of	 the	 directors	 are	 to	 be	 employed	 for	 that	 end.	 	 The	 discretion	 of	
directors	is	to	be	exercised	in	the	choice	of	means	to	attain	that	end	.	.	.	.”).	
	 236	 See	id.	at	682	(withholding	a	dividend	from	the	shareholders	“would	defeat	their	
just	 expectations”	 (quoting	 MORAWETZ	 ON	 CORPORATIONS	 (2d	 ed.),	 §	 447));	 David	 B.	
Guenther,	The	Strange	Case	of	the	Missing	Doctrine	and	the	“Odd	Exercise”	of	Ebay:	Why	
Exactly	Must	Corporations	Maximize	Profits	to	Shareholders?,	12	VA.	L.	&	BUS.	REV.	427,	




	 239	 ADOLF	 A.	 BERLE	 &	 GARDINER	 C.	 MEANS,	 THE	 MODERN	 CORPORATION	 AND	 PRIVATE	








From	the	 foregoing,	 it	 follows	 that	 if	 shareholders	expect	wealth	
maximization,	 then	wealth	maximization	 is	 the	 proper	 end.242	 	 But	 it	
also	 follows	 that	 if	 shareholder	expectations	 change	or	become	more	
nuanced,	so	too	should	the	ends	that	directors	pursue.243		I	suggest	that	
shareholder	 expectations	 of	 profits	 are	 in	 fact	 nuanced;	 they	 do	 not	
want	profits	derived	from	harming,	by	way	of	example,	(1)	health	and	
the	environment;	or	(2)	human	rights.244		
Consider	 the	 first	 “nuance”	 to	 the	general	 rule	 that	shareholders	
want	profits—i.e.,	 that	shareholders	do	not	want	profits	derived	from	
harming	 health	 or	 the	 environment—as	 an	 example.	 	While	 one	 can	




be	based	upon)	avoiding	harm	 to	 the	health	of	 the	broader	public	 as	
well.			
Likewise,	 human	 rights.	 	 Professor	 David	 Bayne,	 S.J.,	 wrote	 in	













WM.	 &	 MARY	 L.	 REV.	 823,	 841	 (1988)	 (When	 courts	 apply	 fiduciary	 duties,	 the	
“justifiable	expectations	of	 the	shareholders	 in	a	publicly	held	corporation	 .	.	.	 should	
be	protected.”);	Therese	H.	Maynard,	Spinning	in	a	Hot	IPO-Breach	of	Fiduciary	Duty	or	
Business	 as	 Usual?,	 43	 WM.	 &	MARY	 L.	 REV.	 2023,	 2083–84	 (2002)	 (suggesting	 that	
default	fiduciary	duty	rules	should	reflect	what	shareholders	reasonably	expect).	
	 244	 One	 problem	 with	 such	 nuanced	 expectations	 is	 what	 those	 expectations	
actually	are.		Philip	C.	Sorensen,	Discretion	and	Its	Limits—An	Analytical	Framework	for	
Understanding	and	Applying	 the	Duty	 of	 Care	 to	 Corporate	Directors	 (and	Others),	 66	
WASH.	U.	L.	Q.	553,	584–85	(1988)	(discussing	that	while	the	theoretical	basis	 for	the	






in	 2020,	 Pope	 Francis	 observed	 that,	 “in	 the	 effort	 to	 amass	wealth,”	
investors	should	avoid	doing	so	through	“exploitation.”246		
Professor	Santiago	Mejia	does	important	work	on	the	theoretical	
foundations	 of	 moral	 obligations	 transferring	 from	 shareholder	 to	
director:	at	 the	same	 time	 that	 the	director	 (agent)	pursues	profit	on	
behalf	 of	 the	 shareholder	 (principal),	 the	 director	 is	 bound	by	many,	




Professor	 Mejia	 created	 a	 two-part	 test	 for	 determining	 which	
moral	obligations	“roll	over”	from	shareholder	to	director:	(1)	it	must	
be	 a	 moral	 obligation	 implicated	 by	 the	 business	 the	 corporation	 is	
engaged	in;	and	(2)	it	must	be	a	moral	obligation	that	the	shareholder	
would	 want	 the	 director	 to	 discharge	 on	 her	 behalf.249	 	 Professor	





For	 the	 reasons	 listed	 above,	 a	 decision	 that	 implicates	 a	
significant	 social	 policy	 issue	 is	 exactly	 the	 kind	 of	 decision	 where	
shareholder	 expectations	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 more	 nuanced.	 	 Because	
shareholder	 expectations	 are	more	 nuanced,	 the	 ends	 in	 our	means-
ends	analysis	must	be	more	nuanced	as	well.			
Returning	 to	 our	 hypothetical	 decision	 to	 build	 a	 power	
generation	 plant,	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 will	 be	 required	 to	 build	 a	
profitable	 plant	 while	 avoiding	 health	 and	 environmental	 harm.	 	 To	







	 247	 Santiago	 Mejia,	 Weeding	 Out	 Flawed	 Versions	 of	 Shareholder	 Primacy:	 A	





causing	 reputational	 harm	 to	 the	 corporation	 are	 not	 entirely	 unique.	 	 But	 previous	




While	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 can	 examine	 profitability	 using	
traditional	 business	 analysis,251	 examining	 health,	 environmental	
harm,	 and	 reputational	 harm	 requires	 policy	 analysis.	 	 I	 call	 the	
combination	 of	 business	 analysis	 and	 policy	 analysis	 “Multiple	 Ends	












































	 251	 For	a	discussion	of	how	business	decision-makers	decide	whether	 to	pursue	a	
project,	 see	 ASWATH	 DAMODARAN,	 APPLIED	 CORPORATE	 FINANCE	 162–224	 (2d	 ed.	 2005)	
(analyzing	 profitability	 of	 building	 a	 factory	 to	 produce	 linerboard).	 	 For	 a	 broader	
explanation	of	business	decision-making,	see	generally	Earnest	R.	Archer,	How	to	Make	
a	Business	Decision:	An	Analysis	of	Theory	and	Practice,	69	MGMT.	REV.	54,	55–59	(1980).	
	 252	 For	 an	 explanation	of	 policy	 analysis,	 see	Warren	E.	Walker,	Policy	Analysis:	 A	
Systematic	Approach	to	Supporting	Policymaking	in	the	Public	Sector,	9	J.	MULTI-CRITERIA	
DECISION	ANALYSIS	11,	14–18	(2000)	(using	an	eight-step	process).	




























































	 254	 See	 Brent	 J.	 Horton,	 Terra	 Incognita:	 Applying	 the	 Entire	 Fairness	 Standard	 of	











First,	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 will	 need	 to	 make	 sure	 the	 power	







so,	 where.255	 	 Professor	 Warren	 E.	 Walker	 describes	 how	 he	 was	
approached	by	the	Dutch	government	to	conduct	a	policy	study,	part	of	




Professor	 Warren	 evaluated	 impacts	 on	 safety	 and	 natural	
settings	 qualitatively.257	 	 Likewise,	 in	 our	 power	 generation	 plant	
hypothetical,	 we	 should	 estimate	 the	 effects	 on	 health	 and	 the	
environment	 qualitatively	 (although	 quantitative	 estimates	 may	
certainly	play	a	role	as	well).	
Qualitative	analysis	is	important	because	some	costs	to	health	and	
the	environment	are	difficult	 to	quantify.258	 	Not	every	 impact	can	be	
reduced	 to	 a	 number.	 	 For	 example,	 by	 interviewing	 those	 directly	
affected	 by	 similar	 decisions	 (by	 this	 company	 or	 one	 of	 its	
competitors),	we	 can	 gain	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 similar	
decisions.259	 	 For	 example,	 if	 a	 competitor	 recently	 built	 a	 coal-fired	












be	 reduced	 to	 a	 number,	 “[b]y	 engaging	 intimately	 with	 individuals	
directly	affected	by	 laws,	policies,	and	systems,	qualitative	work	adds	
context	and	nuance	 to	 [those	numbers].”260	 	That	 is	why	 the	National	





also	 must	 “discuss	 the	 relationship	 between	 that	 [quantitative]	




to	 engage	 in	 qualitative	 analysis.	 	 Every	 year,	 business	 schools	 are	
getting	 better	 at	 training	 them	 to	 do	 so.265	 	What	 I	 am	 saying	 is	 that	
directors	 do	 not	 have	 any	 special	 expertise	 regarding	 qualitative	
analysis	 of	 health	 or	 environmental	 harm.	 	 Deference	 to	 directors	








1980)	 (finding	 that	 private	 construction	 of	 power	 transmission	 line	was	 not	 “major	
federal	action”).		Under	some	circumstances,	however,	a	private	action	may	qualify	as	a	
“major	 federal	 action”	 if	 “the	project	 receives	 significant	 federal	 funding;	 [or	where]	
the	 federal	agency	must	undertake	 ‘affirmative	conduct’	before	 the	non-federal	actor	
may	act.”	 	Mineral	Pol’y	Ctr.	 v.	Norton,	292	F.	 Supp.	2d	30,	 54–55	 (D.D.C.	 2003);	 see	
generally	David	J.	Hayes	&	James	A.	Hourihan,	NEPA	Requirements	for	Private	Projects,	
13	 B.C.	ENV’T.	AFF.	 L.	REV.	 61	 (1985)	 (discussing	 problems	 that	 arise	when	 privately	
funded	projects	are	found	to	involve	“major	federal	action”).	




	 264	 40	C.F.R.	§	1502.23	(stating	 further,	 “[f]or	purposes	of	complying	with	the	Act,	
the	 weighing	 of	 the	 merits	 and	 drawbacks	 of	 the	 various	 alternatives	 need	 not	 be	
displayed	 in	 a	 monetary	 cost-benefit	 analysis	 and	 should	 not	 be	 when	 there	 are	
important	qualitative	considerations”).	









their	 company’s	 reputation	 caused	 by	 controversial	 decisions.	 	 A	
fascinating	 case	 study	 about	 this	 appears	 in	 Why	 Napalm	 is	 a	
Cautionary	 Tale	 for	 Tech	 Giants.266	 	 In	 that	 article,	 Kevin	 Roose	
explains	how	Dow	Chemical,	which	was	widely	known	 for	household	
goods	like	Saran	Wrap,	suddenly	became	known	for	napalm.267			
Dow’s	 reputation	 was	 destroyed	 when	 it	 began	 to	 produce	





It	was	 a	 reputational	 harm	 that	 the	Dow	directors—for	 all	 their	
training	 and	 experience—significantly	 underestimated.272	 	 To	 the	
extent	 that	 the	directors	did	 foresee	 reputational	harm,	 they	 thought	
about	 it	 in	purely	quantitative	terms.273	 	They	thought	(wrongly)	 that	
the	harm	would	be	proportionate	 to	 the	napalm	contract’s	 value,	 i.e.,	
the	 reputational	 harm	would	 be	 small	 because	 “napalm	was	 a	 small	
part	of	the	company’s	overall	business.”274			
Qualitative	 analysis—i.e.,	 listening	 to	 early	 signs	 of	 opposition	
through	 interviews	 and	 focus	 groups275—would	have	 revealed	 to	 the	
directors	 the	 kind	 of	 backlash	 they	 could	 expect.276	 	 But	 qualitative	
analysis	is	not	directors’	expertise.277			
As	 is	 the	 case	 with	 qualitative	 assessment	 of	 health	 and	
























the	 decision-making	 process	 (after	 all,	 ther	 is	 what	 they	 are	 most	
comfortable	 with).278	 	 Unfortunately—yet	 interestingly—one	 study	
found	 that	 when	 subordinates	 report	 quantitative	 probability	
assessments	 (as	 opposed	 to	 qualitative	 probability	 assessments)	 to	
higher-ups,	 the	 probability	 assessments	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 turn	 out	
wrong.279	 	 That	 means	 that	 when	 a	 decision-maker	 asks	 for	
quantitative	assessments	of	 future	events—such	as	 impacts	on	health	






analysis.281	 	 For	example,	 to	determine	 the	 future	net	 cash	 flows	of	 a	
project,	 the	 board	 of	 directors,	 as	 sovereign	 of	 the	 corporation,	 can	
order	management	to	provide	them	with	the	necessary	information.282		
As	Professor	Bainbridge	points	out	in	describing	the	board	of	directors	
as	 a	 sovereign	 that	 has	 access	 to	 information	 by	 fiat,	 “[i]nformation	
flows	 up	 a	 branching	 hierarchy	 to	 a	 central	 office.”283	 	 Thereafter	
“binding	decisions	flow	back	down.”284			
The	board,	however,	has	no	superior	access	to	the	qualitative	data	
necessary	 to	 evaluate	 health	 or	 environmental	 impacts.	 	 Directors	
 
	 278	 Even	 those	who	make	policy	 for	a	 living	 tend	 to	believe	 that	 correct	decisions	
can	be	reached	using	“improved	technical	skills”	and	sometimes	lose	sight	of	the	fact	
that	 “[other	 c]ompetencies	 usually	 considered	 ‘softer’—imagination,	 judgment,	
interpretive	skills—are	just	as	important.”		See	Walker,	supra	note	252,	at	26.	
	 279	 Jeffrey	 A.	 Friedman,	 Jennifer	 S.	 Lerner	 &	 Richard	 Zeckhauser,	 Behavioral	
Consequences	 of	 Probabilistic	 Precision:	 Experimental	 Evidence	 from	National	 Security	
Professionals,	71	INT’L	ORG.	803,	817	(2017).	
	 280	 Id.	at	817.	 	 Interestingly,	 the	same	study	 implied	that	decision-makers	seem	to	
recognize	 that	 they	 are	 getting	 inaccurate	 (or	 at	 least	 misleading)	 information,	 and	
compensate	for	it	by	seeking	more	information.		Id.	at	814–15.	
	 281	 Bainbridge,	supra	note	26,	at	124.	







(even	 if	 they	 are	 the	 sovereign	 of	 the	 corporation)	 cannot	 order	
members	 of	 the	 local	 community	 to	 provide	 them	with	 information.		
They	may	have	better	 luck	with	stakeholders	with	whom	they	have	a	
preexisting	 relationship—such	 as	 shareholders,	 suppliers,	 and	
customers—but	 again,	 they	 do	 not	 have	 superior	 access	 that	 would	
justify	the	sort	of	deference	required	by	the	business	judgment	rule.	
5.		Some	Conclusions	Regarding	Expertise	
In	 short,	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 may	 have	 superior	 expertise	 in	
assessing	 the	 corporation’s	 ability	 to	meet	 the	 first	 end,	 profitability.		
But	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 does	 not	 have	 any	 superior	 expertise	 in	
assessing	 the	 corporation’s	 ability	 to	 meet	 the	 second	 end,	 avoiding	
health	and	environmental	harm,	or	the	third	end,	avoiding	reputational	
harm.	
Further,	 assessing	 the	 second	 and	 third	 ends	 involves	 access	 to	
information	not	readily	at	the	fingertips	of	directors	or	the	corporation	






The	 second	 rationale	 for	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 (and	 the	




Shareholders	 consent	 to	 risk-taking	 by	 directors	 based	 on	 the	
assumption	that	the	corporate	liability	shield	will	limit	their	downside	
risk	 (their	 loss	 is	 limited	 to	 their	 initial	 investment),	 as	will	portfolio	
diversification.287	 	 But	 neither	 a	 liability	 shield	 nor	 portfolio	
diversification	will	 protect	 a	 shareholder	 from	 risk	 to	 their	 health	 or	
the	environment.288	
It	is	also	doubtful	that	shareholders	are	willing	to	turn	a	blind	eye	










funded	 take	 risks	with	 the	 health	 of	 others	 or	 the	 environment	 that	
others	 enjoy.	 	They	will	want	 to	 take	an	active	 role	 in	 such	decision-
making,	thus	undercutting	any	argument	in	favor	of	deference.	
Society	 more	 broadly	 consents	 to	 director	 risk-taking	 because	




the	 unemployment	 rate.	 	 But	 the	 downside	 risk	 for	 decisions	 that	





If	 it	 is	 not	 appropriate	 to	 apply	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 to	 a	




not	 seem	 appropriate,	 for	 two	 reasons.	 	 First,	 it	 is	 often	 outcome	
determinative;	it	would	be	very	difficult	for	a	director	decision	to	pass	







Fortunately,	Delaware	 courts	have	 shown	a	willingness	 to	adopt	
standards	of	 review	between	 the	extremes	of	business	 judgment	and	
 
	 289	 Hu	&	Westbrook,	supra	note	136,	at	1381.	
	 290	 The	 Effects	 of	 Climate	 Change,	 NAT’L	 AERONAUTICS	 &	 SPACE	 ADMIN.,	
http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/	 (last	 visited	 Feb.	 12,	 2021);	 see	 Jody	 Freeman	 &	




	 292	 Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	Unocal	 at	 20:	Director	Primacy	 in	Corporate	Takeovers,	
31	DEL.	J.	CORP.	L.	769,	795	(2006).	
	 293	 Weinberger	 v.	 UOP,	 Inc.,	 457	A.2d	 701,	 711	 (Del.	 1983)	 (“[W]e	 recognize	 that	





policy	 rationales	 for	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 apply	 with	
significantly	less	force.	
A.		The	Enhanced	Scrutiny	Test	(And	Why	It	Fits	Here)	
In	 the	 1980s,	 there	 was	 a	 wave	 of	 hostile	 takeovers.295	 	 The	
corporate	 raider—e.g.,	 Carl	 Icahn	 or	 T.	 Boone	 Pickins—would	
purchase	a	company	and	then	sell	off	its	parts.296		In	response,	boards	
of	 directors	 of	 target	 corporations	 began	 putting	 in	 place	 defensive	
measures	designed	to	fend	off	the	raider	(such	as	poison	pills,	lockups,	
or	stock	repurchases).297			
When	 corporate	 raiders	 challenged	 these	 defensive	 measures,	
courts	 reviewed	 them	 under	 the	 very	 deferential	 business	 judgment	
rule,	 which	 generally	 led	 to	 victory	 for	 the	 boards	 of	 directors	
implementing	the	defensive	measures.298		That	changed	(the	standard,	
not	 the	 outcome)	with	Unocal	 v.	Mesa	 Petroleum	 Co.299	 	 In	 that	 case,	
Pickins’	company,	Mesa,	engaged	in	a	coercive	two-tier	“front	loaded”	
tender	 offer	 for	 Unocal’s	 shares	 at	 fifty-four	 dollars	 per	 share.300	 	 In	
response,	the	Unocal	board	approved	a	self-tender	offer	for	the	shares	
at	 seventy-two	 dollars	 per	 share.301	 	 (The	 self-tender	 offer	 would	
require	 Unocal	 to	 take	 on	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 debt,	 making	 it	 less	
attractive	to	the	corporate	raider.302)	
Mesa	challenged	the	defensive	measures	in	court,	arguing	that	the	
board	 violated	 its	 fiduciary	 duties	 by,	 inter	 alia,	 approving	 the	 self-
tender	offer.303		Conceptually,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Delaware	situated	
the	 case	 somewhere	between	a	duty	of	 care	 case	 (requiring	business	
 
	 294	 See	 In	 re	 Dollar	 Thrifty	 S’holder	 Litig.,	 14	 A.3d	 573,	 597	 (Del.	 Ch.	 2010)	
(“Avoiding	 a	 crude	 bifurcation	 of	 the	world	 into	 two	 starkly	 divergent	 categories—
business	 judgment	 rule	 review	 reflecting	 a	 policy	 of	 maximal	 deference	 to	
disinterested	 board	 decisionmaking	 and	 entire	 fairness	 review	 reflecting	 a	 policy	 of	
extreme	 skepticism	 toward	 self-dealing	 decisions—the	 Delaware	 Supreme	 Court’s	
Unocal	and	Revlon	decisions	adopted	a	middle	ground.”).	























of	 necessity	 confronted	 with	 a	 conflict	 of	 interest,	 and	 an	
objective	decision	is	difficult.306	
So,	the	Court	concluded:	
Because	 of	 the	 omnipresent	 specter	 that	 a	 board	 may	 be	
acting	 primarily	 in	 its	 own	 interests	 [to	 entrench	 itself],	 .	.	.	
there	 is	 an	 enhanced	 duty	 which	 calls	 for	 judicial	
examination	 at	 the	 threshold	 before	 the	 protections	 of	 the	
business	judgment	rule	may	be	conferred.307	




the	 Unocal	 board	 met	 its	 burden	 by	 reaching	 the	 well-supported	
conclusion	that	the	Mesa	offer	was	inadequate,	and	that	the	self-tender	
offer	 was	 a	 proportionate	 response.310	 	 (It	 must	 be	 emphasized	 that	
Unocal,	 in	 addition	 to	 rejecting	 business	 judgment	 deference,	 placed	
the	 initial	 burden	of	 proof	 on	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 to	 “at	minimum	
convince	 the	 court	 that	 they	 have	 not	 acted	 for	 an	 inequitable	
purpose.”311)	
Why	 should	 the	 intermediate	 standard	 of	 enhanced	 scrutiny	 be	
used	(or	modified	for	use)	in	the	context	of	decisions	that	implicate	a	














public	 policy	 requires	 it.312	 	 In	Blasius,	 protecting	 the	 sanctity	 of	 the	
shareholder	 vote	 outweighed	 traditional	 public	 policies	 in	 favor	 of	
application	of	the	business	judgment	rule.313		(The	corporation	tried	to	
argue	 that	 “packing”	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 was	 a	 valid	 exercise	 of	
business	 judgment.314)	 	 Likewise,	 where	 a	 decision	 implicates	 a	
significant	social	policy	issue,	rationales	in	favor	of	enhanced	scrutiny	
(shareholder	 input	 regarding	 policy	 issues)	 are	 strong,315	 while	
rationales	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 (i.e.,	 deference	 to	
expertise	 and	 encouraging	 risk-taking)	 apply	 with	 significantly	 less	
force.316			
Second,	 plaintiffs	 challenging	 a	 decision	 that	 implicates	 a	





that	 the	 court	 applies	 enhanced	 scrutiny	 requires	 the	 board	 to	
communicate	to	the	court	(and	thus,	the	shareholders)	the	information	
it	 relied	 on	 to	make	 the	 decision	 and	why	 that	 decision	 fits	within	 a	
range	 of	 reasonable	 alternatives,	 enhancing	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	
decision.318		As	mentioned	in	the	Introduction,	this	prevents	the	board	
of	directors	from	bypassing	shareholder	input	when	making	decisions	














	 317	 Clark	W.	Furlow,	Reflections	on	the	Revlon	Doctrine,	11	U.	PA.	 J.	BUS.	L.	519,	522	
(2009);	see	Corwin	v.	KKR	Fin.	Holdings	LLC,	125	A.3d	304,	312	(Del.	2015)	(“Unocal	
and	Revlon	are	primarily	designed	to	give	stockholders	and	the	Court	of	Chancery	the	









scrutiny	 test	 is	 appropriate	 (as	 compared	 to	 the	 version	 used	 in	 the	
defensive	 measures	 context).	 	 First,	 the	 shareholder	 challenging	 the	
decision	 must	 show	 that	 the	 decision	 implicates	 a	 significant	 social	
policy	 issue.	 	 Thereafter,	 the	 burden	 would	 shift	 to	 the	 board	 of	
directors	 to	 demonstrate	 (1)	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 “the	
decisionmaking	 process	 employed	 by	 the	 directors,	 including	 the	
information	on	which	the	directors	based	their	decision;”	and	(2)	“the	
reasonableness	 of	 the	 directors’	 action	 in	 light	 of	 the	 circumstances	
then	existing.”320	
In	 judging	 the	 second	 prong,	 the	 court	 should	 show	 some	
deference	 (albeit	 not	 to	 the	 level	 of	 business	 judgment	 deference)	 to	
the	 reasonableness	 of	 the	 decision	 itself.	 	 As	 the	 Delaware	 Supreme	
Court	in	Paramount	Communications	v.	QVC	Network	wrote:	“[A]	court	
applying	 enhanced	 judicial	 scrutiny	 should	 be	 deciding	 whether	 the	
directors	made	a	reasonable	decision,	not	a	perfect	decision.”321		If	the	
board	chose	“one	of	several	reasonable	alternatives”	the	court	should	
























How	 would	 the	 modified	 enhanced	 scrutiny	 test	 apply	 to	 our	
hypothetical	scenario?		If	the	board	decides	to	build	a	coal-fired	power	
plant	(or	gas-fired	power	plant,	or	any	other	kind	of	power	plant	that	
the	 shareholder	 plaintiff	 believes	 contributes	 to	 climate	 change),	 the	
shareholder	 plaintiff	 would	 bring	 a	 lawsuit	 seeking	 to	 enjoin	 the	
construction.		The	shareholder	plaintiff	must	show	that	building	a	coal-
fired	power	generation	plant	implicates	a	significant	social	policy	issue.		
If	 they	 are	 successful,	 the	 burden	 would	 then	 shift	 to	 the	 board	 of	
directors	 to	 show	 that	 it	 engaged	 in	 a	 reasonable	 decision-making	




Fortunately,	 we	 can	 borrow	 from	 14a-8	 case	 law	 and	 SEC	 no-action	
letters.323	 	 If	 a	matter	 falls	 into	 one	of	 the	 specified	 categories—or	 is	
significantly	 like	a	matter	 that	 falls	 into	one	of	 the	categories—it	 is	a	
“significant	 social	 policy	 issue.”	 	 (There	 is	 precedent	 for	 using	 a	
category	 approach;	 it	 is	 akin	 to	 the	 “family	 resemblance”	 used	 by	
securities	lawyers	to	determine	when	notes	are	securities.324)		In	Part	
III	above,	I	pointed	out	many	categories	that	are	considered	significant	
social	 policy	 issues,	 including	 human	 rights,	 indiscriminate	weapons,	
and	 decisions	 to	 build	 power	 generation	 plants	 (implicating	 climate	
change).			
Returning	 to	 our	 hypothetical	 scenario,	what	would	 the	 plaintiff	
shareholders	 need	 to	 show	 to	 shift	 the	 burden	 to	 the	 board	 of	
directors?			







foreseeability	 analysis	 seems	 appropriate.325	 	 Can	 the	
decision-maker	 foresee	 the	 decision	 implicating	 the	
 
	 323	 See	supra	Part	III.	
	 324	 See	 Reves	 v.	 Ernst	 &	 Young,	 494	 U.S.	 56,	 64–65	 (1990)	 (adopting	 the	 family	
resemblance	test).	
	 325	 Foreseeability	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 adaptable	 tools	 in	 legal	 analysis.	 	 See	
















thing	 that	 the	directors	will	need	 to	establish	 is	 “the	adequacy	of	 the	
decision-making	 process	 employed	 .	.	.	 including	 the	 information	 on	
which	[they]	based	their	decision.”327		Because	the	matter	implicates	a	
significant	 social	 policy	 issue,	 the	 board	 should	 show	 that	 they	
considered	 ends	 in	 addition	 to	 profit	maximization.	 	 For	 the	 reasons	
discussed	 in	 Section	 IV.B	 above,	 these	 ends	 would	 include	 avoiding	
harm	to	health	and	the	environment	and	avoiding	reputational	harm.		
By	 way	 of	 example,	 as	 to	 the	 last	 end,	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 could	
review	 any	 number	 of	 studies	 regarding	 how	 each	 type	 of	 power	
generation	 plant	 impacts	 climate	 change.328	 	 They	 would	 learn	 that	
coal-fired	plants	release	210.20	pounds	of	carbon	dioxide	per	million	
British	 thermal	 units	 (“Btu”)	 produced,	 and	 natural	 gas-fired	 plants	
release	117	pounds	of	carbon	dioxide	per	million	Btu	produced.329		On	
the	 other	 hand,	 solar,	 wind,	 and	 hydroelectric	 are	 not	 significant	
sources	of	carbon	dioxide.330	
 
	 326	 The	dictionary	definition	of	“implicate”	is	“to	entwine	in	or	with.”	 	Implicate,	v.,	
OED	 Online	 (Oxford	 University	 Press	 2020),	 https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
92475?rskey=0EVSqI&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid.	
	 327	 Paramount,	637	A.2d	at	45.	
	 328	 ENVIRONMENT	 BASELINE,	 supra	 note	 175,	 at	 4	 (breaking	 down	 carbon	 dioxide	




Chou,	 The	 Impact	 of	 Environmental	 Regulation	 on	 Fetal	 Health:	 Evidence	 from	 the	
Shutdown	of	a	Coal-Fired	Power	Plant	Located	Upwind	of	New	Jersey,	90	J.	ENV’T	ECON.	&	








As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 IV.C	 above,	 however,	 the	 board	 of	




to	 conduct	 such	 studies	 themselves	 (although	 they	 can);	 they	 may	
incorporate	existing	studies	into	the	decision-making	process.	331			
The	 final	 prong	 requires	 the	 directors	 to	 establish	 “the	
reasonableness	 of	 [their]	 action	 in	 light	 of	 the	 circumstances	 then	
existing.”332		Here,	as	stated	in	Paramount,	the	court	should	show	some	
deference:	 it	 should	 simply	 ask	 if	 the	 board	 chose	 “one	 of	 several	
reasonable	alternatives.”333			
In	 our	 example,	 while	 a	 coal-fired	 power	 generation	 plant	 may	
produce	 the	 most	 carbon	 dioxide,	 it	 may	 still	 be	 a	 reasonable	
alternative	 (even	 the	most	 reasonable	alternative).	 	Let	me	 illustrate:	
in	 2013	 the	 University	 of	 Alaska	 at	 Fairbanks	 (“UAF”)	 faced	 a	
problem.334	 	 Its	 existing	 coal-fired	 power	 generation	 plant,	 built	 in	
1964,	 was	 reaching	 the	 end	 of	 its	 fifty-year	 life	 span.335	 	 It	 was	
beginning	 to	 fail,	 and	 the	University	 feared	 that	 the	 next	 breakdown	
could	 be	 catastrophic	 (Fairbanks	 winter	 temperatures	 can	 drop	 to	
minus-sixty	 degrees	 Fahrenheit).336	 	 Pipes	 would	 freeze,	 causing	
 
	 331	 The	President’s	Council	on	Environmental	Quality	suggests	 that	“qualitative	 .	.	.	
discussion	 of	 the	 impacts	 of	 GHG	 emissions	 [can	 be]	 based	 on	 authoritative	 reports	
such	 as	 the	 USGCRP’s	 National	 Climate	 Assessments	 .	.	.	.”	 	 Memorandum	 from	
Christina	 Goldfuss,	 Chair,	 Council	 on	 Env’t	 Quality,	 to	 the	 Heads	 of	 Fed.	 Dep’ts	 &	
Agencies	 10	 (Aug.	 1,	 2016),	 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/documents/nepa_final_ghg_guidance.pdf	 (citing	 U.S.	 GLOBAL	
CHANGE	 RESEARCH	 PROGRAM,	 CLIMATE	 SCIENCE	 SPECIAL	 REPORT,	 FOURTH	 NATIONAL	 CLIMATE	
ASSESSMENT,	 Volume	 I	 (2017)).	 	 Many	 utilities	 have	 already	 begun	 to	 conduct	 or	
participate	in	qualitative	studies	of	how	their	own	infrastructure	may	be	impacted	by	
climate	 change.	 	 See	 U.S.	 DEP’T	 ENERGY,	 A	 REVIEW	 OF	 CLIMATE	 CHANGE	 VULNERABILITY	
ASSESSMENTS:	CURRENT	PRACTICES	AND	LESSONS	LEARNED	FROM	DOE’S	PARTNERSHIP	FOR	ENERGY	
SECTOR	CLIMATE	RESILIENCE	15	(2016)	(“For	example,	a	qualitative	risk	assessment	may	








	 336	 See	 Univ.	 of	 Alaska	 Fairbanks,	 Combined	 Heat	 and	 Power	 Plant:	 Project	
Background,	 https://www.uaf.edu/heatandpower/background.php	 [hereinafter	
Project	Background]	(discussing	the	impact	of	plant	failure	to	university	finances	and	
infrastructure);	 Tim	 Bradner,	 UAF	 Needs	 $200M	 Power	 Plant	 Replacement,	 Sooner	




hundreds	 of	millions	 of	 dollars	 of	 damage.337	 	 The	University	 (which	
ironically	 conducts	 a	 great	deal	 of	 climate	 change	 research)	 could	be	
required	to	close.338			
The	decision-makers	at	UAF	looked	at	several	possible	alternative	
solutions,	 including	 coal,	 natural	 gas,	 solar,	 wind,	 and	 hydroelectric;	
they	even	looked	at	a	small	nuclear	reactor.339	 	But	they	chose	a	coal-





gets	 three	 to	 four	hours	of	 sunlight	a	day.343	 	As	 to	wind,	 “[t]he	wind	
doesn’t	 blow	much	 in	 Fairbanks.”344	 	 They	 looked	 into	 hydroelectric,	
but	that	would	depend	on	the	construction	of	the	Watana	dam	on	the	












	 341	 Id.	 	(“The	oil	and	gas	fields	of	the	state’s	North	slope	are	500	miles	north.	 	The	
nearest	major	port	is	in	Anchorage,	350	miles	south.”).	













–	ANCHORAGE,	 Sept.	 17,	 2017	 (“[W]e	 even	 looked	 at	 a	 nuclear	 option	 but	 that	 didn’t	
work	 out	 so	well.”);	 Ravenna	 Koenig,	 In	 Interior	 Alaska,	 Reinvestment	 in	 Coal	 Power	












very	 different	 in	 another	 geographic	 location.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 the	







The	 second	 justification	 is	 that	 judges	 are	 hesitant	 to	 second-guess	
risk-taking	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors—because	 such	 risk-
taking	accrues	 to	 the	benefit	 of	 shareholders	 (and	even	 society	more	
broadly).353	
However,	 as	 judge-made	 law,	 the	 business	 judgment	 rule	 is	
subject	 to	 judge-made	 exceptions.	 	 For	 example,	 courts	 will	 get	
involved	where	(1)	the	directors	have	engaged	in	fraud;	(2)	it	is	shown	
that	 the	 directors	 have	 engaged	 in	 self-dealing,	 or	 their	 loyalty	 is	
otherwise	called	into	question;	or	(3)	the	decision-making	process	was	
grossly	 negligent.354	 	 I	 propose	 to	 add	 the	 following	 to	 this	 list	 of	
exceptions:	 (4)	 the	 decision	 implicates	 a	 significant	 social	 policy	
issue.355	 	 Where	 the	 significant	 social	 policy	 issue	 exception	 is	
triggered,	 the	 directors	 must	 show	 (1)	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 the	
decision-making	 process	 employed,	 and	 (2)	 that	 they	 chose	 one	 of	
several	reasonable	alternatives.356	
The	 reason	 for	 my	 proposed	 additional	 exception	 is	
straightforward:	 the	 traditional	 justifications	 for	 judicial	deference	 to	
 
	 348	 Conditions	Attached	to	University	of	Alaska	Fairbanks	Power	Plant,	ALASKA	J.	COM.	












the	 board	 of	 directors	 (such	 as	 the	 board’s	 expertise	 or	 encouraging	
optimal	 risk-taking)	 apply	 with	 significantly	 less	 force,	 if	 at	 all,	 to	
decisions	that	 implicate	significant	social	policy	 issues.357	 	While	such	
decisions	 still	 call	 for	 quantitative	 analysis	 of	 profitability,	 they	 also	
call	 for	qualitative	 analysis	 of	 impacts	on	 such	matters	 as	health	 and	
environment,	 or	 human	 rights.358	 	 While	 directors	 may	 have	 special	
expertise	 with	 regard	 to	 quantitative	 analysis,	 they	 do	 not	 have	 any	
special	expertise	with	regard	to	qualitative	analysis	that	justify	judicial	
deference.359		
Turning	 to	 optimal	 risk-taking,	 shareholders	 defer	 to	 directors’	
assessments	 of	 risk	 based	 upon	 the	 assumption	 that	 their	 downside	
risk	is	limited	and	financial	in	nature.360		But	risks	raised	by	significant	
social	 policy	 issues	 (like	 climate	 change	 or	 human	 rights	 violations)	
cannot	be	diversified	away,361		nor	are	they	purely	financial.362	
Further,	 an	 analogous	 area	 of	 law—exclusion	 of	 shareholder	
proposals	 as	 interfering	 with	 ordinary	 business	 operations	 of	 the	
corporation—has	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 exclusion	 for	 significant	 social	
policy	 issues.363	 	 Shareholders	 cannot	 be	 prevented	 from	 submitting	
proposals	 that	 implicate	 climate	 change,	 human	 rights	 (forced-	 or	
child-labor),	or	indiscriminate	weapons.364		It	seems	odd	that	a	similar	
exception	 has	 not	 evolved	 in	 the	 area	 of	 business	 judgment	 rule	
jurisprudence,	 especially	 considering	 that,	 in	 reverse,	 the	 ordinary	
business	 operations	 exclusion	 evolved	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 ensure	 that	











	 365	 Rule	 14a-8’s	 ordinary	 business	 exclusion	 evolved	 from	 the	 business	 judgment	
rule	itself.		Here,	the	SEC	response	to	a	question	posed	by	Senator	Herbert	H.	Lehman	
in	1956	are	instructive:	
Question:	 How	 does	 the	 Commission	 determine	 whether	 a	 proposal	
made	by	a	stockholder	under	rule	14a-8	relates	to	the	ordinary	business	
operations	of	the	issuer?	
Answer:	 The	 policy	 motivating	 the	 Commission	 in	 adopting	 the	
[ordinary	 business	 exclusion]	 is	 basically	 the	 same	 as	 the	 underlying	
policy	of	most	State	corporation	laws	to	confine	the	solution	of	ordinary	
business	 problems	 to	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 .	.	.	.	 	 The	 basic	 reason	 for	




into	 the	 corporate	 decision-making	 process,	 albeit	 through	 litigation.		
This	is	especially	important	when	we	consider	that	shareholders	have	
been	 locked	 out	 of	 less	 “confrontational”	 means	 of	 influencing	
corporate	 behavior,	 such	 as	 the	 process	 for	 nominating	 directors	
(shareholders	can	vote	for	directors,	but	the	vote	is	for	a	preordained	
slate	 of	 directors).366	 	 In	 closing,	 there	 is	 something	 especially	
disturbing	about	not	allowing	shareholders—who	are	the	true	owners	
of	the	corporation—to	challenge	board	decisions	regarding	important	














SEC	 LEXIS	 38,	 *3	 (Jan.	 6,	 1954)	 (declaring	 that	 state	 law	 governs	 ordinary	 business	
exclusion).	
	 366	 Roiter,	supra	note	15,	at	52–53.	
	 367	 Matheson	&	Olson,	supra	note	13,	at	1458–59.	
